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Abstract  
Last few years has seen evaluation of the oil and gas industry into innovative subsea solution 
and technological leap leading to the subsea factory. Taking this into perspective the marine 
subsea industry is one of the most developing sectors involving many stakeholders with a wide 
range of background to perform various operations. These operations bring together marine 
operators, ship owners, subsea asset owners/asset operators, subsea equipment manufacturers, 
various subcontractors, yards, etc., to work together under demanding conditions. Due to high-
risk nature of oil & gas business, such operations constitute various critical features requiring 
specific measures to reduce unwanted events and risk exposure. The permit to work (PTW) 
system is such a critical measure, which is an integral part of a safe working structure that can 
help to manage the wide range of activities taking place simultaneously. Risk assessment and 
risk mitigation, which are core elements for the PTW system, are key contributors for safe 
execution of jobs. A comprehensive PTW system should not only determine how the work can 
be carried out safely but also should envisage human factors involved in operations. 
 
In addition to generic features that are relevant to normal PTW systems, there are specific needs 
to account for the nuances of the marine subsea industry. This is to increase the safety as well 
as efficiency of operations especially under demanding conditions in terms of time, cost, and 
safety. Years of experiences have begun to question if PTW systems should be applied to all 
activities since current practices have a considerable potential to lead to many confusions 
among stakeholders weakening the overall effectiveness. This would require a closer analysis 
of the current PTW systems and practices to ensure safety integrity as well as to establish an 
effective work interface between stakeholders. 
 
This thesis assesses the state of current PTW system in the marine subsea industry and present 
the lesson learnt from previous projects and suggest best practices and potential improvements 
for a seamless interface and expectations. 
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PART ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1. Introduction  
Marine subsea industry is one of the most developing sectors involving many stakeholders with 
a wide range of background to perform various operations. These operations bring together 
marine operators, ship owners, subsea asset owners/asset operators, various subcontractors, 
yards, etc., to work together under demanding conditions. Due to high-risk nature of oil & gas 
business, such operations constitute various critical features requiring specific measures to 
reduce unwanted events and risk exposure.  
 
If oil were blood, then production platforms would be the heart that pumps the blood through its veins 
(Liyanage, 2008). In the past couple of years these ‘hearts’ are moving more subsea. There is a wide 
spectrum of marine operations ongoing with highly specialised state of the art vessels. To 
continue with the analogy- marine operators would be the doctors, keeping the hearts running. 
It could vary from a smaller IMR inspection vessel to state of the art saturation diving vessel 
where the divers have similar condition to astronauts. OLF (2006) concluded with the term 
Integrated Operations to describe the new collaboration, decision engineered revolution in the NCS 
which would lead to seamless integration between the various stakeholders. 
 
The permit to work (PTW) system is one such critical measure, which is an integral part of a 
safe working structure that can help to manage the wide range of activities taking place 
simultaneously. Risk assessment and risk mitigation, which are core elements for the PTW 
system, are key contributors to safe execution of jobs. The process in the permit to work system 
needs to be flexible, yet, robust enough to meet the requirements of all various types of 
operations. Also the implementation and integration of these system should be as seem less as 
possible. 
 
A comprehensive PTW system should not only determine how the work can be carried out 
safely but also should envisage human factors involved in operations. There is need for a 
holistic integrated system which provides standardised approach inclusive of all the aspects of 
the operation. This system should be in line with the industry regulations and best practices.  
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In addition to generic features that are relevant to normal PTW systems, there are specific needs 
to account for the nuances of the marine subsea industry. This is to increase the safety as well 
as efficiency of operations especially under demanding conditions in terms of time, cost, and 
safety. Years of experiences have begun to question if PTW systems should be applied to all 
activities since current practices have a considerable potential to lead to many confusions 
among stakeholders weakening the overall effectiveness.  
 
It should include hazard identification and mitigation, controlling of hazardous operation, lock 
out tag out isolations, subsystem govern activities including confined space entries, lifting, 
working at height, hot works etc. The process should be able to lead the operators step by step 
through the procedures, while highlighting the risks involved and aid them in enhancing control 
of the job and thereby excluding the risk. 
 
Another aspect that is usually forgotten is that the Permit system covering the marine operation 
should not only cover the special or critical operation but also should be capable of covering 
the planned maintenance programs. When the vessel is operational in sea she is highly mobile 
specialised operational unit but in a dock, during a large maintenance period, she goes into what 
could be described as a large process plant mode. The system should have features that would 
cover the work during the major maintenance and modification works such as in a yard or in 
dry dock. An integrated approach for the PTW should be able to interconnect and achieve 
synergy between the various elements of the PTW system. 
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Figure 1 Building blocks of an integrated PTW system. 
With so many aspects to cover, the marine subsea industry seems to be following different 
individual systems which are not following similar standards. They are different depending on 
which company is implementing them. A Marine operator owned system is very different 
from a ship owner owned system even when the work performed is same. This leads to 
confusion in the process. 
Objectives, scope, methodology and delimitation  
The Main objectives of this thesis can be described briefly 
 To study the state of the permit system in the marine subsea industry. Expectations and 
reality  
 Comparative study between various permit systems 
 Suggestion for improvement – in order to facilitate an integrated operations between the 
various stakeholders 
It is very evident that there are differences in the understanding and approach to the PTW 
system by each party involved in the same operation. There are already very obvious 
mismatches in expectations but more significantly these differences in the understanding could 
lead to catastrophes. 
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Scope and structure:   The scope of the thesis is to study the permit to work system in the marine 
subsea industry in detail.  
The first section cover features of a general permit to work system- studying them with relevant 
regulations and guidelines. They are general guidelines which are applicable for all work sites.   
The second section of this report we are going into the specifics of subsea industry. As 
mentioned earlier different stakeholders have different approach to PTW system. In this section 
we will study the features of permit system followed by the main players in the industry – 
marine operator, ship owner, yards   
Third section is a comparative study of the various features in different permit system studied 
in section  
The fourth and final section is suggestion for improvement.  It describes the changes that are 
proposed by the industry expert and experience feedback from previous projects. At the very 
end there is section on need for further action from industry to ensure an integrated approach.  
Methodology: For developing this report is outcome of going through permit 
system/regulations of various shipping companies, Marine operators and onshore/offshore 
EPCI contractors from Norway, UK, Middle East, Asia and Australia. Suggestion were drawn 
from the interviews with various vessel owners/superintends, Captains, master mariners, chief 
engineers, maritime experts, ship yards , engineering directors in the oil and gas industry. Some 
of the suggestion are also drawn from personnel experience in similar projects.  
Limitations: There are 6 major marine operators in the NCS alone and there are numerous ship 
owners and yards which leads to many potential permutations and combinations. Each of these 
alliance will lead to new system of operation.  The case studies discussed in detail are typical 
examples of systems used. But it might be missing certain features that could be available in 
other similar regimes. Also the suggestion made in the report are subjective judgements. While 
developing a new system, there is need to consider the unique feature of the operation which 
needs to be tailor made. These system needs to be developed by collective discussions and 
agreement but the suggestion mentioned in this report can be used as guidelines for 
deliberations. 
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2. Features of the general PTW system  
 
A permit to work system is a formal recorded process used to control work which is identified as 
potentially hazardous. It is also a means for communication between the management, supervisors and 
operators with the work team in the hazardous area. (HSE, 2005). A generic PTW system should include 
 Clear identification of roles and responsibilities 
 Procedures for completing forms, instructions in the issue, use and closure of permits  
 standardised identification of tasks, risk assessments, permitted task duration and supplemental 
or simultaneous activity and control measures along with the modes of communicating  
 facilitate the flow of information between the various parties involved in the job 
 monitoring and auditing to ensure that the system works as intended 
The permit system could be paper based or electronic and is devised by each company to meet specific 
requirements. There are permits which vary vastly in processes, procedure, terminology and system. 
Even in the marine subsea industry each of the stakeholders has their own unique system which varies 
from one another. In this thesis the case studies will look at some of the permit systems in detail and 
will be able to identify the differences.  
Specifically they need to cover a wide range of scope – from construction to operations. While the vessel 
being built or during a large vessel modification scope the permit system will be valid for construction, 
pre commissioning, commissioning and start-up of the new systems installed on the ship. While the 
vessel is operational in the sea the risk management systems should be able to cover all operations on 
the ship including subsea operations. Which all activities will fall under PTW system would depend on 
categorisation of job in the particular PTW system. 
 
A. Guidelines and regulations for permit to work system  
There are various guidelines and regulations that aid in the development, establishment and 
maintenance of a rigid permit to work system. For the fixed and floating production installation in the 
Norwegian continental shelf, ‘Norwegian Oil and Gas Recommended Guidelines for Common model 
for work permits (WP)’ was established by Norwegian oil and gas association that included a working 
committee from the major oil and gas operators.  This thesis will try to initiate the discussion covering 
the permit system for the marine subsea industry. 
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In the UK, the HSG250 Guidance on permit-to-work systems - A guide for the petroleum, chemical 
and allied industries was established by health and safety executives. This give general guidelines to 
the petroleum industry in general.  
International association of oil and gas producers OGP issued, Guideline to PTW system in 1993. This 
was developed by representatives from global oil and gas companies. This was in the wake of Lord 
Cullen report which investigated the fatal piper alpha incident of July 1988. 
For confined space entries there are guideline from worksafeBC, Canada. They were established in 
1917 and give advice in the marine industry in general Shipping –safety guidelines   
In Australia the permit to work system has been influenced heavily by the mining industry. Lots of 
references are made to Mines Safety and Inspection Act 1994 (WA) and Mines Safety and Inspection 
Regulations 1995. Other regulations include Occupational Safety and Health Act 1984 (WA) and 
Occupational Safety and Health Regulations 1996 (WA). 
 
B. Major elements in PTW system 
The guideline mentions some main element that should be included in the PTW system. They are 
described in the sections below  
i. Roles and responsibility 
Roles and responsibilities have to be defined and described for all scope of work with no possibility for 
ambiguity. It is a common practice in South East Asia and Australia that all procedures start with 
definition of roles and responsibilities. When it comes to PTW systems -it is usual for a large work site 
to have a Permit to Work Systems Manager who will be a part of the HSEQ team and will be the owner 
of the PTW system on site. He will be in charge of describing the roles and responsibility for the site. 
He will be liaising closely with the Construction manager who will appoint trained competent personnel 
for each role. In the case of a construction vessel this role is shared by the captain and offshore 
construction manager (OCM). See below some of the roles and responsibilities described as standard 
practices around the world 
Roles  Responsibilities  
Construction 
Manager 
The Construction Manager is responsible for the management of the permit 
to work system for the construction scope of work. 
Pre-commissioning 
Manager (PCM) 
The Pre-Commissioning Manager is responsible for the management of the 
permit to work system for the pre-commissioning scope of work. 
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Issuing authority Issuing Authorities are responsible for: 
• Reviewing the JRAs for the job 
• Approving job risk assessments and allocating a unique JRA number. 
• Ensure correct issue, suspension and cancellation of Work Permits. 
• Reviewing that work can proceed safely with no significant impact to/and 
from SIMOPS 
• Participating in job risk assessments as required. 
• Reviewing all active ICCs, permits and associated documentation is 
available for review. 
• ensuring that the PIC has a detailed understanding of the task, the work 
location and the equipment to be worked on. 
• Verifying that the PIC is aware of responsibilities in case of an emergency 
at worksite. 
• Reviewing that a detailed handover takes place when responsibility is 
transferred to oncoming Issuing Authorities at shift change including the 
status of all Work Permit and isolations under their control. 
• Maintaining an Extended Period Isolations Register. 
Contractor Site 
Manager 
The senior management person on site for each contractor is responsible for 
the appointment and managing the competence of their respective Permit 
Receivers. 
The Permit 
coordinator 
The Permit coordinator is responsible for daily coordination of the Permits, 
maintenance of a PTW register to ensure all Permits are recorded and tracked. 
Responsible engineer The person appointed to be in charge of a specific area of authorization who 
is responsible for reviewing and ensuring that the requirements are complied 
with by the people performing the work. Responsible Person is responsible 
for: 
• verifying  that all work carried out by personnel under their control is 
covered by the appropriate level of documentation/control 
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• verifying that an appropriately detailed risk assessment is carried out for the 
task ongoing 
• verifying that all precautions specified on the JRA are put in place in the 
work site 
• verifying that the work described in the Work Permit is properly completed 
or ensuring that the work is left in a safe condition when the work is stopping. 
Ensuring that the area is clean 
• to be a part of detailed safety briefing with the PIC during the Work Permit 
planning stage and ensure that all hazards have been identified and controls 
can be put in place to mitigate them 
• ensuring  that the PIC has a detailed understanding of the task, the work 
location and the equipment to be worked on 
• Reviewing that the PIC is completely aware of any expected 
actions/responsibilities to be adopted in the event of an emergency 
• verifying that the worksite inspections are carried out before, during and 
after the performance of each task 
Chief 
engineer/System 
Supervisor  
He is the final authority on the systems from a technical point of view   
Work team  Personnel who carry out work described on a Permit to Work under the 
direction of the Person in Charge. They are responsible for: 
• To take part actively and be proactive in understanding a suitable toolbox 
talk by the PIC before starting work and signing the toolbox talk form to 
acknowledge this. 
• Reporting all worksite problems to the PIC as soon as possible 
• Performing work under the terms and conditions specified for the safe 
execution of an assigned work activity at all times. 
• Alerting the PIC as soon as possible on identifying where the conditions 
specified in the Work Permit / Toolbox talk are or cannot be followed 
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Person in charge The person actually carrying out the work, or leading the work party. PIC’s 
are responsible for: 
• Being fully conversant with the work and associated precautions described 
in the task plan and JRA 
• Carrying out the safe execution of assigned work activities and is 
responsible for the work team 
• Briefing and performing toolbox talk to all the workforce under their control 
about the potential hazards, precautions and conditions applicable to the work 
• verifying the Work Permit, JRA and any associated documentation is 
approved by the Responsible Person before starting the task and that the 
approved Work Permit is displayed at the worksite, where practicable. 
• verifying the worksite is left in a safe and tidy condition at the suspension 
or completion of work activities. 
• Returning the Work Permit and closing out  to the Issuing Authority after 
completion of the job or by the end of permit period  
Area authority Person in control of the location where work is to be carried out 
Site checker Person carrying out checks as detailed on the permit. Mostly onshore activity 
Isolation authorities The person responsible for mechanical and electrical Isolations being applied 
prior to invasive work or removed once it is safe to do so. 
Gas tester Suitably trained and competent individuals to test for the presence of 
flammable vapors, toxic gases and oxygen within confined spaces. 
Table 1 Roles and responsibilities - generic 
ii. Procedures relevant to the PTW system  
There are various procedures that need to be followed for the proper implementation of the permit to 
work system on board the vessel. It is important to understand the various steps in the process and how 
they influence the system. The exact sequence could differ from one site to the other based on the needs 
and requirements. But it will be safe to say that all the major aspects will be covered before the work 
onsite is completed. 
The Permit system starts with the planning for the job including preparation of the procedures and work 
plans. It will extend to risk assessment and JRA relevant for the job. These processes may not seem very 
complicated but when there is large scope of work each item will need to be done planned and organised 
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carefully. In beginning of 2014 there was a major modification work for one of the major construction 
vessel in the North Sea. There were 80 work plans that were completely different and had to be executed 
safely as quickly as possible. To have proper risk assessment of such a big scope itself is a massive task. 
If there we spend even one hour on each work pack for risk assessment – there is need for 10 days to 
cover just the risk assessment part of the work. This shows the importance of everyone involved in the 
job to understand and plan for having sufficient risk assessment and control measures. Even the 
engineers involved in the early planning stage should be having this in mind as combining the work 
plans will help in efficient implementation of the PTW system. There are various tasks that will be a 
part of the routine list in the vessel and need not be covered in the PTW system. While granting a permit 
the Issuing authority must take into consideration, location of activity, tasks to be undertaken. Other 
work in area, mitigation measures in place and rescue plans before granting the exception.  
Experiences have begun to question if PTW systems should be applied to all activities since current 
practices have a considerable potential to lead to many confusions among stakeholders weakening the 
overall effectiveness. There has been certain scopes of work that should be covered on PTW 
 Non-production work (e.g. maintenance, repair, inspection, testing, alteration, construction, 
dismantling, adaptation, modification, cleaning etc.); 
 Non-routine operations 
 Jobs where two or more individuals or groups need to co-ordinate activities to complete the 
job safely; 
 Jobs where there is a transfer of work and responsibilities from one group to another. 
(HSE,2005) 
Some of the systems are now going electronic and paper free. There should be an interface between 
these electronic versions with paper system so that authorization can be made from anywhere on the 
vessel/site. It should be noted that accessing to networks from inside the tank or confined spaces might 
not be possible. Solution could be for using paper copies and then feeding them online later on but that 
would hinder parallel permit validation process. In 2013 a construction vessel operating in the 
Norwegian sector tried to phase in a completely paperless operation with all procedures and system fed 
into iPad but the system failed to meet the lofty goals because of accessibility issues. This is very relevant 
considering the fact the connectivity in the North Sea is supposedly much better than some of the other 
operational area around the world and accessibility will be an issue in the open seas. This will also be 
applicable  
There can be multiple copies of the permit made. This will obviously depend on the type of permit 
system used but it’s important that all the relevant personnel take care of the permits and handle them 
as is required. The permits must be stored even after the work is complete for audit purposes. 
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Validation and checking the permits are critical element of the PTW system. It would again differ from 
one system to another.Permit interactions are very important to identify and they are to be handled very 
carefully by the issuing authority. On a marine operation side of business there are certain areas that will 
take priority over any planned maintenance work 
1. dive system when divers are in water 
2. cranes during deployment or recovery  
3. thrusters ( DP systems) when ship near an installation 
No permit should be given out for any work that will influence these. Also there can be a system which 
will highlight and warn the issuing authority if any work will indirectly affect these system as a knock 
on effect  
Permits running across shifts: Handovers are critical links in a safe system. There should be clearly 
understandable handover system should be in place. Handover regime should cover all the permit 
controlled work ongoing and the work should be stopped at a shift in a stage where it can be easily 
communicated and understood by the incoming group. 
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Figure 2 Flowchart for a generic permit to work system 
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iii. Display for the permits: 
Lord  Cullen report after the Piper alpha says Copies of all issued permits should be displayed at a 
convenient location and in a systematic arrangement such that process operating staff can readily see 
and check which equipment is under maintenance and not available for operation. (Piper alpha, Lord 
Cullen report) 
It has been noted on ship yards and mobilizations bases across the world that this is not a practice that 
is being strictly followed. There are multiple of reasons: 
Mobilizations for marine operations are very time bound and ship could potentially berth any of the 
quay side. The quality, training and system vary immensely from one yard to the other.  Average 
mobilization time for a ship in the quay side is 3 days where there will be a large group of subcontractors 
joining the vessel and it is very difficult to train them to higher standards within the short duration of 
time.   
iv. Tool box talk:  
Tool box talk is carried out with work party by the PIC where the full work party discusses the following 
as minimum 
1. it will be attended by all the members of the work party 
2. plans for the work is explained in detail by the PIC 
3. procedures are reviewed in detail 
4. responsibilities for each and every one is identified  
5. hazards are identified and barriers are discussed and identified  
6. Access and egress for the work location. Placement for key emergency items and systems such 
as first aid kit, fire extinguishers, radios etc. 
7. isolation needed for the job 
8. simops in the location of the worksite 
9. equipment and tools to be used for the job 
10. each person with sign the tool box talk form with date and time where they acknowledge that 
they understand the roles and responsibility 
11. there has to be a culture of openness and transparency during such meetings 
12. tool box talks need to be topped up every time a new member is joining the team 
v. Closing a permit  
On completion of the work, the Permit Receiver shall indicate that the work is complete by signing off 
the permit and returning the permit to the Permit Issuer. The PTW is only considered closed when signed 
off by the Permit Issuer. The Permit Issuer or delegate will visit the site, confirming that the work site 
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has been left in a safe and acceptable condition. The permit is then retained by the Permit Issuer and 
passed to the PTW Coordinator for record keeping. 
 
C. Types of permits and certificates 
There are various types of permits and certificates that are relevant to most worksites. Below are a list 
of various permits that is used in various industries.  
i. Hot work permit  
Hot work permit is required for all work involving ignition source i.e. naked flames, welding, flame 
cutting, grinding, the use of heat shrink blowers etc. Hot work is usually taken to apply to an operation 
that could include the application of heat in areas where flammable atmospheres may be present. Hot 
work permits, typical are more generally applied to any type of work which involves actual or potential 
sources of ignition and which is done in an area where there may be a risk of fire or explosion, or which 
involves the emission of toxic fumes from the application of heat.(HSE, 2005) 
A cold work permit is usually applicable in onshore facilities but they are very rarely used in marine 
subsea industry. Work on any equipment and or pipe work that has been formally handed over to Pre-
commissioning following the issuance of a (MC) Mechanical Completion certificate. A cold work 
permit is required for all electrical/mechanical run checks onshore.  
 
ii. Confined space entry 
Once an area has been determined as a Confined Space a Confined Space Entry Permit is required for 
all entry or work to be conducted in a confined space.  
 
Confined space entry certificates (unless detailed on a hot work or cold work permit) are used to specify 
the precautions to be taken to eliminate exposure to dangerous fumes or to an oxygen-depleted 
atmosphere before a person is permitted to enter a confined space. The certificate should confirm that 
the space is free from dangerous fumes or asphyxiating gases. It should also recognise the possibility of 
fumes desorbing from residues, oxygen depletion of the atmosphere as a result of oxidation, or the 
ingress of airborne contaminants from adjacent sources. The certificate should specify the precautions 
to be taken to protect the enclosed atmosphere against these hazards, e.g. by forced ventilation, physical 
isolation or by the provision of personal protective equipment including breathing apparatus. (HSE, 
2005) 
 
The confined space entry, the task/s to be undertaken within the space must be risk assessed by a 
competent person/s before work associated with the confined space is carried out. 
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Notice of energization 
An NOE is required prior to the energisation of any part of an electrical system, inclusive of all electrical 
commissioning activities above fifty volts. 
Radiation work certificate 
A Radiation Work Certificate is required for any work that involves the use of radioactive sources or x-
ray machines for Non Destructive Testing (NDT). There is need to take radioactive material offshore 
especially when there is hyperbaric welding (underwater welding) and the x-rays are used for NDT. 
Skandi Arctic (DSV) had to take radioactive source during hyperbaric welding in the Stadfjord C 
worksite. There were special areas designated on the deck to store the radioactive source.  
iii. Working at height certificate: 
Working at height is identified as one of critical operation as it has been the cause of many fatalities.  
There are certain basic guidelines to guide the working at height. There has to be permits in place 
when personnel undertake any of the following activities:  
 Work is being performed at heights over energised (live) plant  
 The use of a fall arrest system is required then working above 2m, where protection is not 
provided by a permanent structure or scaffold with equivalent protection (i.e. mid rail, top rail 
[900-1200mm] and toe board) 
The UK health and safety executive in their working at height guidelines says: 
 do as much work as possible from the ground 
 ensure workers can get safely to and from where they work at height 
 ensure equipment is suitable, stable and strong enough for the job, maintained and checked 
regularly 
 make sure you don’t overload or overreach when working at height; 
 take precautions when working on or near fragile surfaces 
 provide protection from falling objects 
 Consider your emergency evacuation and rescue procedures. (HSE,2014) 
The graph shows that the WAH risk involved in the marine industry is higher than other high risk 
industry (construction industry). So there are further stricter regimes in the marine industry (details are 
mentioned in the case studies). 
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Figure 3 Incident rate (serious claims per 1000 employees) for marine sector (source: SWA) 
 
Removal of Platform, Grating, Handrail or Stair Treads Certificate  
A Removal of Platform, Grating, Handrail or Stair Treads Certificate is required for the removal 
replacement and/or alteration of all platform, grid mesh or checker plate, handrail or stair tread once it 
has been installed, inspected and opened for access. 
iv. Electrical permit / Isolation confirmation certificates 
Isolations form the major requirement prior to working on electrical or mechanical system. Before a 
permit to work can be issued for a task, a risk assessment must be conducted to determine equipment 
isolation requirements. Wherever isolations are required an isolation confirmation certificate (ICC) is 
required. The ICC combines on one document a record of all isolations required to perform the work in 
safety.  
 
The equipment may require isolations from:  
 Sources of electricity  
 Process fluids and pressure  
 Mechanical drives  
 Control systems  
 
The ICC ensures that the isolations are applied and documented in a thorough and systematic manner. 
The Permit shown on the Permit Register on the ICC may be signed as close against the ICC by the 
PTW Coordinator, upon sighting the actual Permit as having been closed by the Permit Issuer. 
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i. Lock out and tag out procedure 
Any Authorised Person who is required to work on any equipment, which is energised or has the 
potential to be energised, shall obtain the appropriate permit / certificate from the TPO Permit Issuer 
and work in accordance with the applicable Work Method Statements. The permit / certificate will 
describe all equipment to be isolated and define the exact boundaries of the isolation including valves 
and blinds. This is done using P&ID / Electrical Drawings etc. Prior to de-isolation signed approval will 
need to be obtained from issuing authority. 
Where there are other personnel or work groups working on an isolated system, this shall be 
appropriately identified on the Isolation Certificate, stating PTW numbers and type.  
Extended Period Isolations (EPI) will be controlled using the section on the Isolation Certificate, 
detailing the reason for the extended period isolation. The Permit Issuer will sign this section on initial 
placement of this as an EPI, review monthly and sign acknowledgement, with justification of the 
isolation still being in place.  
 
A register attached to the ICC is available to allow for isolations to be de-isolated and then isolated or a 
boundary isolation to be changed. This allows for testing etc. on equipment within the boundary 
isolation. Under tis register keys must be authorised to be released and then signed out by those requiring 
the de-isolation. Once the task is complete and the isolation re-established, the keys are then signed back 
in by all parties 
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PART TWO: DETAILED STUDY OF TYPICAL PTW 
SYSTEMS 
 
3. Case study 1. Marine operator PTW work system 
Marine operators are the main installation or intervention stakeholder who is responsible for subsea 
intervention. They are in charge of the main operations related to the subsea asset. They could be 
operating in their own vessel or could hire in a third party vessel from a ship owner. Marine operators 
will have their own PTW system integrated into the vessel if the vessel belongs to them. When it is a 
third party vessel the permit system will depend on the agreement/contract between the marine operator 
and ship owners. Marine operator PTW routines are followed usually if the ship is on a long term charter 
with the operator. There are examples in the NCS when two different types of PTW systems are being 
used in two different vessels between the same marine operator and ship owner. 
 Marine operators have invested substantial time and resources in the development of the safe permit to 
work system, based on the present regulations and guidelines. This section will go through the main 
features of the PTW system followed by some of the marine operators.   
A. Roles and responsibilities  
In the permit system the roles and responsibilities on the vessel are clearly identified with the hierarchy 
of approval. There is training matrix which is verified vs the required competency matrix to ensure that 
the personnel are suitably trained for the responsibilities they are supposed to perform. There is usually 
an onshore coordinator who maintains the competency matrix and ensue that personnel get adequate 
training when due. 
Another key feature of this system is that most of the training, especially for the work party members 
are done online. This is saving much time and resources and has been a big success in the North Sea 
sector. 
Roles  Responsibilities  
Captain/ vessel 
master 
The captain of the ship has the final authority on the vessel.  He has the 
overall responsibility for the safety of personnel and operations onboard. He 
also ensures the competences of people for doing the job.  
Construction 
Manager 
The Construction Manager is responsible for the management of the permit 
to work system for the construction scope of work. On a third party vessel 
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OCM will be the responsible for ensuring the company policy are followed. 
There is usually a bridging document showing the responsibility sharing 
between OCM and captain. 
Issuing authority/ 
bridge 
Issuing authority is usually the chief officer who is responsible for reviewing 
and approving of JRA, ensuring the validity and correctness of the work 
permit, along with suspension of relevant work permits when applicable. 
They are verifying the isolation certificates for the job.  
Responsible engineer The Vessel master/offshore construction manager appoints a Responsible 
Person for a specific location. He is responsible to ensure that the work in the 
allocated location is carried out under the correct regimes. Vessel master 
maintains a list of competent persons who can act as area responsible. 
HSE coordinator Vessel HSE coordinator is an offshore position with lots different scopes to 
perform. 
 Ensure the JRA are suitable and numbered correctly  
 Ensure that the company policies are implemented properly 
 Assist the OCM in the implementation company philosophy 
 Have site inspection to ensure that the PTW system ae implemented 
correctly  
Chief 
engineer/System 
Supervisor  
Technical expert –refers to a person identified as the technical expert on the 
area on the machinery that is going to be worked upon. Before a planned 
maintenance is to be carried out , the responsible person discusses with Chief 
engineer/ System supervisor to let him know about the details for the work 
that is needed to be performed and associated risk or supervisory 
considerations needed. Usually there is chief engineer on the vessel who is 
the expert on the vessel system and there are system supervisors for each 
main systems in the vessel. 
Work team  Personnel who are actually performing the work onsite. They are led by 
Person in charge who is the leader for the work party and is responsible for 
the safety of operations. They participate in tool box talk which will be held 
by the person in charge. 
Person in charge The leader for the work party and is responsible for the safety of operations. 
They participate in tool box talk which will be held by the person in charge. 
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Isolation authorities Isolation authorities, appointed by the vessel master, competent to approve 
electrical, mechanical or instrument isolations. Also they ensure that the 
proposed isolations does not have any impact anywhere else. For the 
electrical items on the vessel it will be the vessel electrician. 
Table 2 Roles and responsibilities - cases study 1 
 
B. Planning and categorization of work onboard 
For any operation there are various stages from planning to execution and subsequently to completion.  
It is important that an integrated PTW system can address all the various stages of the operation.  An 
integrated approach ensures that no main items are missed/overlooked due to human misjudgement. 
Also it serves not only as a checklist, but also as a planning tool when properly utilised. 
i. Planning 
Planning for an operation could be ongoing for many days, months or even years but it’s important that 
brief description of the work and reference to relevant procedures are added to the permit so that the 
work team can refer to the job when they are needed. 
Operations in the marine subsea industry should have an operational procedure which covers 
methodology, roles and responsibilities mentioned in it. A good procedure will also mention in the 
beginning the tools needed, operation to be completed prior to start up, potential hazards involved, 
technician operators needed etc. identified and listed in the beginning of the method statement. This 
procedure should be mentioned in the permit for reference. 
As a part of the daily planning of operations on the vessel a planning meeting is held every day where 
responsible engineers and area responsible present the scope for next 24 hours.  It can be seen as a 
permit/ planning meeting where various scopes are presented. The vessel masters, offshore managers 
who are looking at the scopes are able to see the simops and priorities the work activities. Certain scopes 
can be given priority over others in case of simops. It also can be used as a schedule updating meeting 
where the live schedule can be studied and updated in detail. This is particularly valid in the case of 
major reconstruction work in the ship.   
Main steps in planning of an offshore operation is  
 Definition of the scope of work  
 A detailed work statement showing clearly the methodology 
 Schedule the work for planning and allocation of resources 
The work could possibly fall under  
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1. Work requiring a work permit  
2. Work falling under ‘routine jobs 
3. New jobs IA can decide on the permit requirements  
 
ii. Work requiring a work permit  
A Permit will be required where any work is needed for any operations, where there could be potential 
hazards to personnel involved, safety of plant and environment. 
 Non-production work (e.g. maintenance, repair, inspection, testing, alteration, construction, 
dismantling, adaptation, modification, cleaning etc.) 
 Non-routine operations 
 Jobs where two or more individuals or groups need to co-ordinate activities to complete the job 
safely 
 Jobs where there is a transfer of work and responsibilities from one group to another. 
(HSE,2005) 
The section below shows the specific jobs that are listed in marine operators system that would cover 
the main scopes of operations a vessel capable of subsea interventions are able to carry out. These jobs 
could mostly covered by a combination of the permit system available on the vessel and the permit 
system on field in which they are operating.  
 
Specific jobs Details  
Working in confined 
spaces 
 
Confined spaces contribute to one of major risks on a vessel. It’s very 
important from the marine operators’ side that the confined areas on the 
vessel are clearly marked. Rescue and emergency system are clearly 
marked and labelled ready for use. Procedures for confined space entry 
including guards are closely followed.  
Working on / 
overriding safety 
systems 
 
Caution should be taken in case of working or overriding safety system. 
The systems need to be controlled properly with detailed risk assessment 
prior to operations. It also very important that the close out report of such 
maintenance or modifications is clearly mapped documented and 
understood. 
Hot work involved Hot work include cutting, burning, welding. It is necessarily introducing a 
spark in the area and control measures have to be in place. An example 
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 would be no weldable areas on the deck. Example: Direct welding on top 
fuel tanks should not allowed in any circumstances unless the tanks are 
properly vented, cleaned and air tested. There should clear marking of non 
weldable areas on the deck. 
Involving diving 
 
Work where divers are involved and to include both saturation diving and 
air diving.  
Involving heavy lift 
 
There should be permit while doing heavy lifting. There are usually critical 
tasks with many parties involved-Deck crew, crane drivers, engineers, 
bridge (maintaining the trim of the vessel). 
Involving subsea 
intervention 
 
Intervention work involving the ROV or divers on subsea asset will need 
permit authorization and certificates from the asset operators. This could 
also include trenching , dredging etc. 
Involving energy 
isolations 
 
Could be involving the electrical – generators, switch boards, PLC systems.  
Care should be given not only to high voltage connections but also to low 
voltage connections as lots of incidents are reported while working on latter 
system.  
Pipe/cable laying  Permit will be needed when we are laying cables or pipelines from the hip 
to the seabed. There will be substantial work on the deck including rotating 
reels, tensioners, hold back arrangements etc. that would need the area to 
be barrier off limits. Also there is substantial work on the sea bed. 
Working over the side 
of the vessel 
 
Permit is needed when work is performed by the side of the vessel. Life 
vest have to worn at all times and fast rescue craft (FRC) needs to be on 
standby in case of any eventualities. 
Work involving 
unfamiliar equipment’s 
/ systems and 
procedures 
 
Detailed Risk assessment needed prior to operation of a new equipment 
onboard the vessel. These are covered by the permit. 
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Tasks involving 
dangerous substances 
 
There could be various dangerous substances that are taken onboard for the 
project specific requirements. An example is radioactive substance taken 
onboard for X-raying of the welds in underwater subsea hyperbaric 
welding. Special transportation boxes are used and special areas are 
demarcated on the vessel. 
SIMOPS / 
environmental factors 
could possess a threat 
 
If there any activities that could be of concern to the environment, it should 
be given special consideration. These requirements are very stringent 
especially in offshore Brazil. 
Issuing authorities 
thinks it is needed  
 
The Bridge could decide if any operation needs to be covered by the PTW 
system based on the complexity of operations.  
Table 3 major subsea intervention operation from ships 
 
iii. Work falling under routine jobs 
Non permit operations – the issuing authority can categorize a work that does not fall under hazardous 
operation or routine activity as a non-permit activity. A non-permit is a low hazardous well understood 
activity. The risk and protective measures are well understood by the work party. Some activities that 
are included this list. 
See below the list of activities that are listed in the routine operation  
Specific jobs Details  
Routine samplings  
 
These routine sampling could be done by marine crew who will be 
responsible for the sampling for vessel system. Ex: an example for the 
routine sampling work could be air sampling works for the diving gas for 
testing the quality of air. This work is performed by dive techs or life 
support techs. 
Mooring of the ship 
 
The mooring of the ships is performed by ABs from the marine crew based 
on the direct command from the bridge. Usually the captain gives direct 
commands to the marine crew on radio on  the mooring requirements. 
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Normal rigging 
activities 
 
The normal rigging activities are performed by the deck crew under the 
direct supervision of the deck foreman. ABs are usually are in charge of 
rigging for the provisions coming to the galley or the gangways.  
If the main deck cranes are used it will be the team of the crane operators, 
deck riggers and deck foreman. It is usual that the deck foreman will take 
out a permit for working at height at the start of the shift. There is usually a 
good practice to have a tool box talk even in case of routine activities.  
Normal crane activities  The normal activities include simple lifting which comes in standard shapes 
and well within the capacity of the crane. This is usual during the 
mobilization or in the yard. 
Some standard lifts:  standard containers, standard baskets, pallets,  small 
clump weights 
Special crane operations: heavy lifts, spools, complex shapes like GRP 
covers, templates, manifolds etc. Deck foreman or crane divers are usually 
is in charge of these. 
Galley duties  Galley duties are usually carried out by dedicated galley crew. Main 
precaution comes in the design and fabrication with fire proofing elements 
preventing the fire to spread across the board in case of any eventualities.  
Table 4 list of routine jobs 
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Bombay high incident, 2005 – highlighting the importance of incorporating safety culture by 
EVERYONE on board, including the galley operators 
The Mumbai High Field was discovered in 1974 and is located in the Arabian Sea 160km west of the Mumbai 
coast. It consisted of NA small wellhead platform built 1976, MHF residential platform built 1978, MHN 
processing platform built 1981, MHW recent additional processing platform. 
 
The complex imported fluids from 11 other satellite wellhead platforms and exported oil to shore via undersea 
pipelines, as well as processing gas for gas lift operations. The seven-storey high Mumbai High North (MHN) 
platform had five gas export risers and ten fluid import risers situated outside the platform jacket. In July 
2005, a multi-purpose support vessel (MSV) collided with the MHN platform, severing at least one gas riser 
and causing a massive fire which destroyed the MHN platform within two hours. 
Collision 
At time of accident on 27 July 2005, the Noble Charlie Yester jack-up was undertaking drilling operations in 
the field and was positioned over the NA platform. The MSV Samudra Suraksha was working elsewhere in 
field supporting diving operations when a cook on board the MSV cut off the tips of two fingers. Monsoon 
conditions onshore had grounded helicopters, so the injured person was to be transferred from the MSV to 
the MHN by crane lift for medical treatment. While approaching the MHN on the windward side, the MSV 
experienced problems with its computer-assisted azimuth thrusters so the MSV was brought in stern-first 
under manual control and the injured person was transferred off the MSV. 
At around 1605 hours, strong swells pushed the MSV towards the MHN platform, causing the helideck at the 
rear of vessel to strike and sever one or more gas export risers on the MHN jacket. The resultant gas leak 
ignited within a short time. The close proximity of other risers and lack of fire protection caused further riser 
failure. The subsequent fire engulfed the platforms MHN and MHF, causing the complete destruction of the 
MHN. The fire also engulfed the MSV Samudra Suraksha, with heat radiation causing severe damage to the 
NA platform and the Noble Charlie Yester jack-up. Emergency shut-down valves (ESDVs) were in place at 
each end of the risers, but some risers were up to 12 km long and riser failure caused large amounts of gas to 
be uncontrollably released. Six divers in saturation chambers on MSV were left behind when the vessel was 
abandoned. They were rescued 36 hours later. The MSV suffered extensive fire damage and was towed away 
from scene but later sank on 01 Aug 2005, about 18km off Mumbai coast. 
Aftermath  
MHN collapsed after around two hours, leaving only the stump of its jacket above sea level. A total of 384 
personnel were on board the MHN complex and NCY jack-up at the time of the accident. All installations 
were abandoned with 362 crew rescued and 22 reported dead (11 fatalities with 11 missing). 
Source : http://home.versatel.nl/the_sims/rig/mhn.htm 
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C. Procedures relevant to PTW system 
The system for implementation of PTW in each set up is unique. Even among marine operators there 
are various formats available. 
The key steps of the permit to work procedure from marine operator are shown in the flowchart. 
When it comes to the PTW form itself they are divided into various sections as described below. Each 
of the permit form has there copies. One copy is to be kept with the IA, one with PIC and one with RP. 
The forms are usually divided into separate sections.  
Section 1- carries general info about the permit  
For the marine operator system the usually the section 1 will contain the following information that are 
relevant to the work. This section is completed by the responsible engineer or PIC.  They should 
complete this after onsite inspection. 
1. They are uniquely numbered (sometimes renumbered). The importance of the numbering is 
to have reference to the previous permit that was issued for the same job and aid in tracking 
the history and progress of work. It also makes filling out of the forms easier as they can be 
used as reference. 
2. Permit could show what kind of work was involved as a tick off box giving a quick 
overview. This could make it easier for sorting and quick overview of the type of permits. 
It could save valuable time in case of emergencies and there is no need to isolate certain 
jobs. Usually on a vessel the permits are sorted by the type of permit and send to the 
management on a daily basis to give them a quick overview of the activities on the vessel.  
3. Type of work – detailing the type of work will include. Examples would be to specify 
whether it is a hot work, confined space entry, working at height etc.  The permit should be 
described as precisely as possible. 
4. Location of work – the specific location on the vessel should be mentioned on the permit. 
This has to be as specific as possible. Example: when we have confined space entry into 
tanks – the tank numbers has to be specified as they are to be checked.  
5. Description of the work to be carried out – this could vary from very basic description for  
a well understood frequently conducted work  to very detailed description including 
drawings and task plans for work that are unique to the vessel. The permit format should 
have the space to include these details. 
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Figure 4 Flowchart showing PTW process for case study 1 
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Section 2 – control measures/controlling documents  
This section is to be filled up by the responsible person who identifies and include risk control measures 
to the permit request. This section is to be filled by PIC. 
1. References are given to the risk assessments which identify the risks and barriers to meet 
the ALARP levels. The risk assessment are to be completed by PIC 
2. There should be references to the various certificates that are relevant to the operation. 
some examples  of such certificate are 
a. gas test certificate 
b. confined space entry certificate 
c. dive certificate 
d. isolation certificates 
These certificate numbers needs to be cross referenced by the issuing authority  
Responsible person can also discuss with the technical expertise and get advice at this point. 
 
Section 3 Permit validation  
The PIC and RP submit the permit form to IA after completing section 1 and 2 in the permit planning 
meeting. Section 3 will be filled by the vessel master/chief engineer during the permit planning meeting 
and is basically a planning tool. During the planning meeting the vessel master can go through the permit 
along with the risk assessment with his team. Vessel master will approve this section when they are 
happy with the risk barriers in place. Section 3 is filled when the permits are send to the vessel master 
or the issuing authority who will review the permit request and evaluate the condition on the vessel for 
the planned operation and maintenance activity and ensure that all the precautions are in place for doing 
the job.  In case of the large rebuild or modification for the vessel – the time frame flexibility should be 
a big time and resource saver.  
Section 4 – Permit acceptance 
The acceptance of the permit has two step. Step I happen in the issuing authorities’ office. This section 
of the permit is filled, reviewed and signed by the IA after detailed discussion with PIC about the 
precautions and limitations also considering all the work ongoing in the area and prioritizing them as 
required.  IA signs the permit for approval and PIC signs the permit taking responsibility. Copies of the 
permit are taken and distributed accordingly. 
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Number of copies for the work permit: Usually there are 3 copies for the permit.  (Original, copy1 and 
copy2) 
Copy 2 of the work permit is kept at the issuing authority office. They are usually kept in separate pocket 
separating out the various types. They are segregated into hot work; working at height, gas entry etc. so 
as to know which permits are present. Original and copy 1 are kept with the PIC and used site 
verification.  
Some vessel has an A1 copy of the vessel drawing in the issuing office. The issuing authority can have 
color coded magnet dots which could be placed over location of the permit in the drawing.  
The validation of the permit can be up to 72 hours and the RP; PIC in the back to back shifts can sign 
and activate this permit within the mentioned period. 
Suggestion for magnetic colors are (these suggestion were presented by the Health safety executives, 
govt of UK) (HSE, 2005) 
PERMIT COLOUR CODE  
Hot work Red-edged or red 
Confined space entry certificate Green-edged or green 
Equipment disjointing certificate 
/breaking containment permit 
Black-edged 
Isolation certificate White 
High voltage electrical isolation 
certificate 
Yellow-edged or yellow 
Sanction to test certificate White 
Excavation certificate White 
Diving certificate White (or relevant colour from list above if diver carrying 
out that type of work) 
Table 5 colour coding for permits 
 
Original and copy 1 is taken to the worksite where the PIC will conduct a tool box talk with the work 
party.  All the work party members will sign the tool box signoff sheet.  
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Before the work can commence step 2 of the acceptance is completed when the responsible  Engineer 
for the job will inspect the permit, all associated paper work and signs the original and copy 1. 
Copy 1 is carried by the RP who will be responsible to ensure that the work is performed according to 
the systems and procedure for the vessel. 
PIC is responsible for the wellbeing and safety of the work party. The work party is required to inform 
the PIC about any changes in the work. If there is any change in the work condition PIC informs the RP 
and IA. 
By the end of each shift the PIC takes the original copy of the permit to the IA , who will collect all the 
permits and action according whether the permit needs to be reissued for the following shift or not. If 
the work is going to continue and permit is approved for the incoming shift the issuing authority and 
PIC can sign a section of the permit (In both original and copy 2). Next shift PIC will take the original 
to the work site where he will have the inspection with RP, who will sign the original form. 
If there is any suspension for the permit PIC needs to return the original to the IA, where it will be stored 
with copy 2 till the work can start again. When the work overruns the permit allowed time a new permit 
has to be raised. 
Section 5. After the work is completed 
The last section for the form is the work completion section. Once the work is completed the permit 
needs to be signed by the PIC and RP and they are brought to the IA office where all the 3 copies can 
be collected together –signed and archived.  The close out of work permit is one of the most critical 
phase especially in maintenance phase and have to be informed to all the relevant parties. 
If the work is not completed a separate section could be signed which highlight the need for a follow on 
permit in future.  The archives are part of the audit process where all the work permits could be audited 
by trained parties.  
Even among the marine operators PTW vary from paper hard copy format to completely online systems. 
The selection is based on the operational requirements. If the vessel is operating in very remote locations 
then having a completely online system will be difficult. There are also human factors involved 
including training and competence of manning available on the vessel. If it’s a very busy vessel with 
relatively easy job the vessel could be out in the open sea without a trained software technician. 
i. Tool box talk:  
Tool box talk is carried out with work party by the PIC where the full work party discusses the 
following as minimum. Marine operators put special emphasis on tool box talks. They are performed 
after the permit has been issued by the bridge/issuing authority.  The system usually states that there is 
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no need for tool box talks prior to operation unless there is new team member in the work team. It 
includes all the action/discussion point that are mentioned in the general permit system. 
ii. Triggers for stopping: 
The triggers for stopping the job can be mentioned in the permit papers and should be discussed 
with the team during the tool box talk. 
The job can stopped when there if there is  
1. Any changed to permit conditions.  
2. Sounding of alarms – then the workers have to make the work place safe before moving the 
evacuation muster location. The work to start only after clearance is obtained from the issuing 
authority. 
3. If anyone notices a potential hazard or change in condition the Pic is to inform RP and work 
should carry on only after the clearance is obtained.  
4. If the permit is suspended by the PIC – he should return the permit to the RP with a written 
explanation on why the permit was suspended. The RP will be responsible for checking and 
evaluating the safety at the site. IA has to verify that the work site is safe for proceeding with 
operation. 
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D. Electrical PTW system /Isolation certificates 
The permits are usually accompanied by isolation certificates which verify that the workplace has 
barriers in place between stored energy. They can be mechanical isolation (in case of gases and fluid 
etc.) or electrical isolation (in case of electrical appliances). 
The impact of isolation have to viewed in detail and risk accessed this could be the basis for the priority 
given for the job. 
A good example for this the work done recently on an installation vessel where we had to install new 
water hydrant system in the back deck to meet the new deck DNV requirements. This was the peak of 
activities without work going at many places in the vessel. During the risk assessment it was noticed 
that while tapping into the new existing fire system for adding the new system could lean the emergency 
safety system will not be operational and the vessel will not be prepared for any incidents. So it was 
decided to do some trial examples to see how much time would take and how the work could be 
optimized. More personnel where brought to the vessel and it was decided to do the tap in at 4 location 
at the same time in order to save time. An all stop was called for other activities reducing the probability 
for accidents or incidents. The work for the tap in was finished in one and half hours as opposed to initial 
plan for couple of days.  
This was possible because  
1. trial runs showed how the work could be modified to be more efficient 
2. all missing items /tools / parts where identified well in advance during the trial fit up 
3. trial runs showed need for more personnel if work on all 4 location was to happen at same 
time 
4. This work was given priority and all the other works were stopped in order to avoid any 
chance of disruptions. 
Electrical isolation tags  
The electrical tags are very strict and could be done with 
1. potentially two locks with key for one lock going to IA and key for other lock going to PIA 
2. when locking is not possible it could be an idea to remove the fuse and marking clearly not to 
put the fuse back till permit is valid 
3. it is not advisable to use electrical signals to isolate system – there has to be physical 
disconnection 
4. all stored electrical energy in the system should be discharged 
5. all isolation should be checked prior to starting of the work 
6. Tear off slips from caution notice placed in the work site could be added to the ICC. 
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Mechanical isolations 
1. Isolation valves should be physically locked, if possible, while isolated. 
2. Spring loaded valves should not be used for mechanical isolations. It could be removed and 
blinded. If these are not possible there should be a risk assessment to identify additional control 
measures.   
3. High strength plastic red and white chain instead of red and white tape to be used for barrier 
because they last longer. 
4. Pressure check has to be done just before breaking containment. 
5. Highly visible tag which contains details about isolation to be placed with the barrier. color 
coding can be used for various types of tags.                                                                                                                                                              
Extended period isolation: 
Extend period isolation is made when the isolation is made for extended period of time often more than 
the permit times. They are usually done as a part of the maintenance program. 
1. They are used when waiting for spare parts. 
2. When equipment becomes redundant and there is waiting for repairs / modification or 
replacement.  
3. If equipment has been in extended period isolation then they need to be reviewed and inspected 
thoroughly before they can be started up again. the reason being that the system could see 
various changes when left unused for extended periods of time and could lead to unwanted 
behavior of the system. 
Isolation of safety and emergency system- should be carried out under the permit to work system at all 
times.  A detailed risk assessment has to be carried out, covering both personnel and equipment , prior 
to isolating any of the emergency system. 
Safety and emergency system include  
1. alarm system 
2. safety shut down system 
3. fire and gas system  
4. firefighting equipment  
5. emergency escape equipment 
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E. Hot work permit  
The permit to work system usually has good focus on the hot work permits. The physical dangers of 
hot work are very evident so there is caution associated with this genre of work.  Following works fall 
under the permit to work system  
 Gas or Arc welding  
 Gas Cutting  
 Burning and Brazing  
 Grinding  
 Radiography  
 Gasoline Fuelled Engines and Equipment  
 Work on Electrical Equipment  
 Any other possible sources of ignition  
 
There are certain features that applicable to the hot work type of permit 
 Special attention is given to area surrounding the work space.  
 Underdeck areas are of special importance. No welding is allowed over insulation or fuel tank. 
Under deck insulations are some of the biggest time consuming challenges for operation in NCS. 
The insulation is need for class approval before the vessel can sail. To remove the insulation is very 
labor intensive work with lots of working at height involved. The new generation ships are coming 
with double skin on deck to allow for direct welding.  
 No welding is allowed over fuel tanks till they are gas free and tested.  
 There is focus on fire watchers both above and below deck during welding. They need to be wired 
to the radio channel and should carry extinguishers. 
 The fire watchers have to be on watch half an hour after the welding is completed. 
 Special protection is needed for equipment, cables and hoses near to the hot work location. Special 
fire blankets needs to be used.  
 Hose and cable management is very important as they cause the majority of slip hazards.  
 Good ventilation is needed while working in the enclosed area as the welding leads to toxic gases.  
 Proper PPE needs to be worn at all times. Face masks and fire retardant coverall are absolute must. 
There has been incident in 2015 when the coverall got accidental fire because wrong quality. 
 Certified equipment with sufficient safety handles needs to be used. Its common yet unacceptable 
practice to remove the handles of grinders to ease the usability. There has to be proper management 
plan for gas bottles for welding gear.  
 Deck to be marked clearly of NO WELD ZONES. 
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F. Permit for confined space entry 
Confined space is an enclosed or partially enclosed area with limited ventilation where the atmosphere 
might become a health hazard. There should be sufficient ventilation at all times including mechanical 
ventilation fans.  
Permit system list as the potential dangers as: 
1. Process happening in the area.  Example is enclosed area in the ship with marine growth or rust 
will have very limited oxygen as they are already used up. 
2. As result of operation handled earlier before closing the tank. It could be a good idea to maintain 
a log of activities in the identified enclosed areas on the vessel. On the vessel there could be 
enclosed spaces like dry tanks for which activity logs can be maintained.  They needs to be 
referred prior to giving out new permits.  Also it can help to identify the root cause in case of 
any incidents.  
3. Ingress of gases from areas outside the confined space.  
2.1.1. Entry into tanks 
When a tank lids needs to be removed a tank lid certificate is to be raised .This is to track all the lids 
and confined space entries that are ongoing at the vessel. IA keeps an overview of the activities and they 
could be also marked on the vessel drawings with stickers showing location. These certificates should 
show the reason for opening and tags has to be marked so that they could be traced from being open to 
closed and verified.  
There should be a confined tank guard entry who is on the radio with the bridge at all times, who will 
control the entry and exit to the tanks. He will report to the bridge as soon as anyone in entering or 
exiting the area. He also can make note of the name of the people entering and exiting the area so that 
they can be tracked in case of any incidents. He is responsible for having all the safety and emergency 
provisions on standby at the area. 
He should inform the bridge in case of any emergency and try to keep eye contact with the person inside 
the confined space. In case of an emergency he can enter the confined space for rescue only after the 
full rescue team is on the location.  
2.1.2. Gas testing requirements: 
All confined space entry will require gas testing prior to starting the operations. This is to verify the 
quality of atmosphere inside the space. Gas testing is relevant every time it has been identified in a risk 
assessment. 
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The permit system should have a gas certificate frame work which shows the certificate number and 
mentioning the type of test and type of gases to be covered. IA authority should also mention the 
frequency of testing depending on the type of job. 
G. Working at height  
Marine operators usually have very high focus on the working at height procedures. Working at height 
has been the cause of many fatalities on ships and their effect has been bought to the forefront in recent 
years.  
Working at height in the ship is all the more challenging considering the fact that the vessel will be 
moving in the sea. This is all the more critical in areas like the North Sea where the sea can get really 
rough. In 2012, Technip for Åsgard project engineered for a man less deck concept to protect personnel 
from manual operation during high sea states. 
The definition of Working at Height is any work carried out in an area at, above, or below ground level 
where the potential exists to have a fall likely to cause personal injury. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 the main guiding principle for hierarchy of safety measures vs WAH 
Main features for working at height permits are  
 Personnel Working at Height have to be competent, fit and trained for the task. The training 
has to a meet the required level mentioned in the competency matrix. 
 Inspection of safety equipment used by third party every year. 
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 Through inspection by the user prior to use every time.  
 Logging of safety equipment- usually it will be the assistant deck foreman who will be 
responsible for tracking this.  
 Safe access to the work site. Scaffolding are used extensively in NCS. But the quality of 
equipment’s used and skills available vary significantly from yard.  
 Provision for emergency rescue. if it is a long duration job there might be an emergency 
rescue exercise where a dummy is used to see the ease of rescue from the work site. This 
exercise gives a good idea of clamping points for hoisting personnel down.  
 Provide protection from falling objects. It’s not allowed work one above another at the same 
time. Tools falling from the top level to lower level are identified as one of the major causes of 
injuries. 
 The tools needs to have secondary securement when they are working at height-in order to 
prevent them falling down below. 
 Extensive use of anchor points for hooking up and back scratchers for ladders. 
 JRAs have to be issued and approved for WAH. For some of the maintenance there could be a 
generic JRA which needs to be reviewed and approved. 
 Before the Work at Height activities start a specific Tool Box Talk, shall be conducted. This 
needs to be performed beginning of each shift. 
 Planning for the work includes identifying the time needed for accessing and identifying the 
potential for barrier to access. 
 The scaffolding should be built in such a way that there is need for minimum starching when 
on the working platform.  
 
 
Figure 6 Safety matrix for working height 
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H. Lifting procedure: 
 
Offshore lifting is a major operation that is ongoing in the subsea industry. Each of the operators have 
their own safety management system. In an engineered complex lift there are various stages of which 
certain parts will be covered under the vessel permit to work system.  
1. Planning/engineering phase – the task plans are made along with the lift plans and lift rigging 
sketch. Rigging is ordered based on the lift plans. Some special rigging can take up to 3 weeks 
of delivery. 
2. JRAs performed on board with rigging supervisors, deck foreman, and crane driver, vessel crew 
to go through the risk associated with the operation and what barriers could be in place. They 
also discuss what kind of permits will be needed. They are usually 
a. Working at height – to attach rigging, working on outriggers 
b. Hot work- if there is cutting of sea fastening needed for releasing from deck 
3. After all the permits are sorted out -Prior to operation there will be a tool box talk where 
everyone is briefed about their roles and responsibilities. 
4. The bridge will contact the authorities for deploying the module subsea.  
5. The deck foreman will be in charge of the operation and he will be in direct communication 
with the crane driver for crane movements and bridge for the vessel movements.  
 
Special attention is given  
1. Sweeping the module to check there is no loose objects. 
2. All the lifting gear to be checked thoroughly and certificates verified prior to use. 
3. Never work under suspended loads.  
4. Watch for pinched fingers. PPE to be worn at all times.  
5. Safety harness and life jackets to be worn when working at height and working above water. 
6. Use tag lines as needed. 
7. Watch out for simops.  
8. Clear the work area of potential trip hazards. 
9. Avoid working in the tension line of tag lines. 
10. Emergency rescue craft to be on alert. 
11. Divers should be asked to return to the bell if it is a major lift.  
12. Special attention to be given when the module is passing through the splash zone.  
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3. Case study 2.  Ship owner PTW system 
This is a case study of the permit to work system that is used by a ship owner and has some features 
unique when compared to other permit system.  
 
The PTW system define a Work Permit is not only a permission to carry out a potentially dangerous job 
but also a system that determines how a job can be performed safely and how to avoid that two separate 
harmless jobs end together in a hazard. The PTW system is built up with reference to various work 
scopes. The following tasks require a Work Permit and this procedure is linked to: 
1. Work permit - Hot Work (All type of work which can cause sparks, open flame.) 
2. Work permit - Electrical System 
3. Work permit - Working at Heights/outboard 
4. Work permit - Entries into Enclosed/ Confined Spaces  
5. Work Permit - Other (General maintenance work, heavy lift, use of dangerous substances, other) 
6.  Lock Out / Tag Out 
 
In addition a Work Permit is required when work needs to be performed on the emergency system 
including: 
a. Safeguarding systems: emergency stops, relief valves and associated interlocks, quick closing 
valves, MOPS 
b. Alarms: general alarm (PA, status lights), manual alarm call points, Sound powered telephones 
c. Fire & gas detection systems 
d. Fire control: firewater main, hydrants, deluges, sprinkler, foam, CO2, dry powder fire 
extinguishers,  
e. Thrusters/positioning systems 
f. Evacuation and escape: heli-deck, lifeboats, life rafts etc. 
A. Roles and responsibilities  
In this permit system the roles and responsibilities are described with focus on the ship systems. The 
roles are very similar to what is described in the marine systems but there are a few new additions. 
Roles  Responsibilities  
Captain/ vessel 
master 
The Vessel Master has overall responsibility for the implementation of the 
Work Permit system, and for ensuring that procedures and systems are in 
place and that personnel are competent to carry out their functions within the 
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Work Permit system. It will still be each seamen's job and responsibility to 
execute all work in accordance with safe work practice and Good 
seamanship. 
Furthermore it is Master responsibility to assure that all work tasks are 
prioritized looking at the possible SIMOPS. 
Issuing authority/ 
bridge 
A role fulfilled by the Chief Officer or 2nd Officer. Issuing Authorities are 
responsible for: 
• Reviewing detailed risk assessment has been carried out for the task. 
• Reviewing and approving job risk assessments and allocating a unique JRA 
number. 
• Ensure correct issue, suspension and cancellation of all Work Permits. 
• Reviewing that work can proceed safely with no significant impact to/and 
from simultaneous operations / adjacent work. 
• Participating in job risk assessments as required. 
• Reviewing all active ICCs and associated documentation is available for 
review. 
• Reviewing that the PIC has a detailed understanding of the task, the work 
location and the equipment to be worked on. 
• Verifying that the PIC is aware of any expected actions/responsibilities to 
be adopted in the event of an emergency. 
• Carrying out a detailed safety conversation with the PIC prior to Work 
Permit issue to ensure the PIC understands the full conditions of the Work 
Permit. 
• Reviewing that a detailed handover takes place when responsibility is 
transferred to oncoming Issuing Authorities at shift change including the 
status of all Work. 
Permit and isolations under their control. 
• Maintaining an Extended Period Isolations Register. 
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Responsible engineer The person appointed to be in charge of a specific area of authorization who 
is responsible for reviewing that the requirements are complied with by the 
people performing the work. Responsible Person is responsible for: 
• Reviewing that all work carried out by personnel under their control is 
covered by the appropriate level of documentation/control. 
• Reviewing that an appropriately detailed risk assessment is carried out for 
the task. 
• Reviewing that all precautions specified on the JRA are put in place. 
• Reviewing that the work described in the Work Permit is properly 
completed or ensuring that the work is left in a safe condition if not 
completed. 
• Carrying out a detailed safety briefing with the PIC during the Work Permit 
planning stage to ensure that all hazards have been identified and controls 
can be put in place to mitigate them. 
• Reviewing that the PIC has a detailed understanding of the task, the work 
location and the equipment to be worked on. 
• Reviewing that the PIC is fully aware of any expected 
actions/responsibilities to be adopted in the event of an emergency. 
• Reviewing that the worksite inspections are carried out before, during and 
after the performance of each task. 
 
Work team  Person(s) who carry out work described on a Permit to Work under the 
direction of the Person in Charge. They are responsible for: 
• Reviewing that they receive and understand a suitable toolbox talk by the 
PIC before starting work and signing the toolbox talk form to acknowledge 
this. 
• Reporting all worksite problems immediately to the PIC. 
• Working under the terms and conditions specified for the safe execution of 
an assigned work activity at all times. 
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• Alerting the PIC on identifying where the conditions specified in the Work 
Permit / Toolbox talk are or cannot be followed. 
Person in charge The person actually carrying out the work, or leading the work party. PIC’s 
are responsible for: 
• Being fully conversant with the work and associated precautions. 
• Carrying out the safe execution of assigned work activities. 
• Briefing (toolbox talk) the entire workforce under their control in the 
potential hazards, precautions and conditions applicable to the work. 
• Reviewing the Work Permit, JRA and any associated documentation is 
approved by the Responsible Person before starting the task and that the 
approved Work Permit is displayed at the worksite, where practicable. 
• Reviewing the worksite is left in a safe and tidy condition at the suspension 
or completion of work activities. 
• Returning the Work Permit to the Issuing Authority after completion of the 
job or by the end of permit period.  
Isolation authorities The person responsible for mechanical and electrical Isolations being applied 
prior to invasive work or removed once it is safe to do so. 
Gas tester Suitably trained and competent individuals who are authorized by the 
Vessel Master to test for the presence of flammable vapors, toxic gases and 
oxygen within confined spaces. 
Table 6 Roles and responsibilities - cases study 2 
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B. Planning and procedures relevant to PTW procedure 
This section describes the permit to work process, steps and responsible involved. 
The permits are prepared in the bridge by the chief officer or the first mate. The responsible engineer 
would contact the bridge for a new permit and handover the permit request.  
i. Preplanning:  
Planning is done by the responsible engineer. He or the person in charge has to produce a job risk 
assessment JRA on the work plan /procedures developed for the operation. JRA are prepared based on 
the type of job that is going to be performed.  If the job is main operation task with many lots of marine 
operations it is advisable to have marine engineers to be present in the JRA.  
After the JRA is completed a tool box talk is carried out with the full work party where the JRA is 
presented to the work party. This is done before each shift where Roles and responsibilities of the work 
party member are also discussed during this tool box talk. The tool box talk usually also contains the 
check list of all potential hazards and they are addressed by the PIC. All the members sign along with 
their roles.  
The PIC or the RP takes the JRA and the tool box talk forms to the IA office where they are reviewed 
by the IA authority.  It is expected that the person in charge fills draft for the permit to work form. But 
that may not be the case all the time when the IA will take responsibility for preparing the whole permit. 
The issuing authorities usually use a draft version or make a draft from a similar previous permit. If it’s 
a completely new work then the A has to populate the whole permit form which takes longer time and 
usually leads to long ques in the IA office.  
For the Person in charge to fill the forms they can access to the online permit system through a password 
protected gateway where they will be able to fill in the permit forms partially. This has been a big 
challenge to implement this as there are have been many issues with online accessibility from site and 
could lead to a standstill if there is no alternate plan. It also has been a challenge to train subcontractor 
Pic to the required level to fill in the online forms. This is often the case because the vessel will see very 
many different Pic as she is visiting various quay side or docks. 
Another item to evaluate is the human factor element of the subcontractor PICs. They will not take full 
owner a ship permit to work system and cannot expect to handle the system carefully and is seen difficult 
to have full control. With these incidents happening frequently the IA on ships are usually reluctant to 
give complete access to the subcontractor PICs. 
IA reviews the permits form along with the other work ongoing identifying any hazops and is approved 
if they are safe to proceed.  The original copy of the permit is signed then by the IA along with the PIC 
who accepts the responsibility and responsible engineer ensuring the process is implemented correctly. 
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Two extra copies of the permit are made – the original is kept in the bridge, copy 1 returned to PIC and 
copy 2 is given to the responsible engineer. Maximum duration of the permit is 12 hours or when till the 
PIC is on shift. Before it has become time expired it is possible to Extend a permit to work. The extension 
certificate can be printed out showing till when the permit is extended to. The appropriate persons sign 
it. It is copied and the extension cert is attached to the front of the permit. 
 
When the permit is issued the online system will show the permit to be in green indicating that the permit 
is active. By the time the permit runs out it will change the colour to red. Once the permit is activated 
the IA place them in the permits issue display board which sorted into various types of permits.  
Issuing authority or chief officer takes rounds to see that the permit system is respected and conditions 
mentioned in then risk assessment are met and maintained.   All permits are automatically suspended in 
the event of an emergency. The personnel are briefed to stop all work and make the area safe and proceed 
to emergency stations. 
 
By the end of the shift – the PIC is responsible to ensure that the work is restored to a safe state and the 
site will be inspected by responsible engineer. If the work is complete IA, Pic and RP will sign out the 
permit. They will also remove the lock out. 
 
If the work is not completed – the status of the work is discussed by the PIC, RP in their handovers. 
Before a shift goes off they are required to secure the area and the status of the job is explained to the 
new team members by PIC during the tool box talk. There is option to extend the permits but they 
usually new permits are taken out for each new shift. 
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Figure 7 Flowchart showing the PTW process for case study 2 
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C. Procedures relevant to PTW system 
 
The forms of the permit system are tailor made for the operations relevant to marine operations. There 
is focus on the marine operations side. There are many features that are missing from the operators 
system but there could be more emphasis made on the project side of operations. Main sections for the 
permit forms are: 
Section 1- carries general info about the permit 
For the ship owner system - section 1 usually will contain the following information that are relevant 
to the work and are usually filled by the bridge personnel or the issuing authority office. With the IA 
filling the forms there are some specific advantages and disadvantage 
1. Type of work and description of work – detailing the type of work.  As the system asks for 
the issuing authority to fill in the permit format there are some advantages and 
disadvantages. 
Advantages:  
a. Issuing authority will have better understanding of the work to be performed. 
b. There is more control over the permit system.  
c. All the permits will have similar style of application and there is less chances of 
confusions.  
Disadvantages: 
a. Much more time consuming than the marine operator system and there is usually a big 
waiting line for the permit in the issuing authority office.   
2. Location of work – the specific location on the vessel should be mentioned on the permit. 
This has to be as specific as possible. Example: when we have confined space entry into 
tanks – the tank numbers has to be specified as they are to be checked.   
3. Work location responsible: this is identified as the personnel who will be responsible for 
the area of the work. 
Section 2 – control measures 
This section is also filled in by the issuing authority and includes space for adding the file names for 
risk assessment, certificates etc.  But in this case there were no check boxes for typical certificates 
which could have served as a reminder for the Issuing authority and could have reduced the chances 
for human errors.   
Safety integrity under demanding conditions: A study on Permit-to-Work (PTW) systems in 
the Marine-Subsea sector 
 
pg. 54 
 
Section 3 identification of control measures  
Section 3 in this permit system is the control measures that need to be in place for the safe execution of 
operation.  The measures mentioned in the list will depend on the permits that are requested for. They 
have a reminder for the various items including PPE, precaution equipment required, notifications etc. 
This basically serves as a check list and is helpful in reducing the human error factors. 
1. Personnel protection equipment  
a. Coverall  
b. Ear protection 
c. Face shield 
d. Gloves 
e. Hard hat  
f. Safety shoes 
g. Safety glass 
2. Precaution equipment required  
a. Barricades 
b. Fire hose  
c. Scaffolding   
d. Ventilation 
e. Warning posted  
f. Watchman 
3. Notification internal 
a. Bridge 
b. Client rep 
c. Company office 
d. Crane operator  
e. ROV supervisor 
4. External notification 
a. Port authority 
b. Yard 
c. Stand by vessel 
Section 4 – Approval section  
In the ship operator Permit system the Issuing authority will sign the permit in section 4 followed by 
the signature for the person in charge and the responsible person. All the three sign the permit in the 
IA office.  The work can commence as soon the work permit is issued and displayed on the work site.  
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 Section 5 – close out section 
Section 5 is the close out section of the permit where the IA, PIC and responsible engineer will sign 
the closing out of the permit. PIC and RP has to meet in the IA office and sign-out the original form 
stating that that work is complete or area is returned to safe state. And form is kept in the archives for 
12 months after the job is complete. 
 
D. Electrical systems permit to work/isolation certificates 
 
The risks of electrical shock are much greater on board ships than they are ashore because the conditions 
of wetness, high humidity and high temperature, inducing sweating, reduce the contact resistance of the 
body. All maintenance Work on High Voltage Systems, above 50 volts, will require a permit to work. 
Severe and even fatal shocks may be caused at voltages as low as 60V. 
Clear legible instructions should be posted in every space containing major switchboards about first aid 
and treatment. Before any work is done on electrical equipment, fuses should be removed or circuit 
breakers opened to ensure that all related circuits are dead.  
Prior to start up always measure that there are no voltage between the phases, and no voltage between 
each phase to earth before any work is started. If possible, switches and circuit breakers should be locked 
open or, alternatively, a 'not to be closed' notice attached. 
Where a fuse has been removed, it should be retained by the man working on the equipment until the 
job is finished. All Electricians shall have their own numbered padlock, controlled under the permit 
system. This is very important for traceability from the IA office. All tools used for electrical 
maintenance tasks e.g. screwdrivers, pliers, spanners, should be insulated up to 1000 volts. Tools should 
not be carried in pockets. 
All insulating PPE and approved insulating rubber matting must be maintained in good condition and 
inspected prior to commencement of the task- this is particularly important during yard stays where there 
will be groups of workers coming in to various scopes including mechanical fit-up and could leave the 
mats in a bad state. All procedural requirements for the use of PPE during Electrical Maintenance are to 
be met. There will be a minimum of two people engaged in the task of Electrical Maintenance on the 
main switchboard, distribution panels and live feed control boxes. One person will be the designated 
worker and the other person is assigned as a watchman for the operations as a lookout should a problem 
arise. The person in attendance should be competent in the treatment of electric shock. 
Main switchboards, distribution panels and live feed control boxes must have warning signs indicating 
the number of people and PPE to be used for servicing the system. The signs are to be in English and 
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other languages common to the ship. All main switchboard, distribution panels and live feed control 
boxes should have insulated mats placed in front of them. If the workspace is hot, the maintenance 
workers should wear a sweatband to soak up perspiration- it’s very much relevant in the warmer areas 
of operations such as Australia , middle east ,gulf of Mexico , brazil, south east Asia. Slight adjustment 
are made to PPE to control sweat. Accidents have occurred when workers have wiped their forehead 
with their sleeve and the wet sleeve has made electrical contact.  
  
Flammable materials should not be left or stored near switchboards. Carbon tetrachloride should not be 
used for cleaning electrical equipment as the vapours are toxic in nature. Other safer cleaning solvents 
such as 1:1:1 trichloroethane are available but even with these the area of use should be well ventilated. 
Solvents should always be used in accordance with manufacturer’s instructions only. 
 
While in operation or in testing it might be needed to work near to live system even though its not 
recommended. Example for such a testing would be DP testing of the vessel where various switch boards 
are opened and closed in order to see how the DP system is responding to power outs from different 
sources maximum precaution have to be taken. The working position adopted should be safe and secure 
to avoid possible fatal contact with live parts arising from a slip or stumble or the movement of the 
vessel Contact with the deck, particularly if is wet, should be avoided. Footwear, if damp or with metal 
studs or rivets may give inadequate insulation. The use of a dry insulating mat is necessary at all times. 
Contact with bare metal should be avoided. A hand-to-hand shock is especially dangerous. To minimise 
the risk of a second contact should the working hand accidentally touch a live part, one hand should be 
kept in a behind protecting back whenever practicable. 
 
Jewellery such as wristwatches, metal identity bracelets and rings should be removed. They provide low 
resistance contacts with the skin. Metal fittings on clothing and footwear are also dangerous. 
Meter probes should have only minimum amounts of metal exposed and insulation of both probes should 
be in good condition. Care should be taken that the probes do not short circuit adjacent connections. In 
measuring voltages greater than 250V the probe should be attached and removed with the circuit dead. 
 
Lockout and tag out system 
Logout and tag out is required wherever there is risk of accidental turn-ons which includes: 
1. Maintenance of electrical systems 
2. Maintenance of pneumatic systems 
3. Maintenance of hydraulic system 
4. Maintenance of fuel powered engines  
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The lockout process involved identifying the energy sources and isolation, all the movable parts to be 
released or blocked and the tag out should state the reason why the machine is out of operation with 
responsible person and date. Barriers needs to be in place when before the equipment is started again 
and tested. 
E. Hot work permit to work 
All Welding and Gas cutting operations require a “Hot Work Permits”. (The only exception to this rule 
is if the vessel has a designated welding workshop)Operators should be trained, competent with the 
equipment to be used and instructed where special precautions need to be taken. Any persons not having 
specific experience and practice in the safe use of gas or electric welding equipment will not perform 
the job. 
 
The Permit focuses on the situation of working place mainly on sufficient lighting especially in tanks 
and other below deck spaces. Where portable lights are needed to provide adequate illumination, they 
should be clamped or otherwise secured in position, not hand held, with leads kept clear of the working 
area. Wire and hose management is critical as it is one of the major causes for trips and falls in a 
mobilisation. They should be placed under wire/hose protection covers or should be coiled up if not in 
use.  
 
Harmful fumes can be produced during these operations especially from galvanizing, paint etc. Oxygen 
in the atmosphere can be depleted when using gas cutting equipment. Noxious gases may be produced 
when welding or cutting. Therefore special care should be taken when welding and cutting in enclosed 
spaces to provide adequate ventilation. . The effectiveness of the ventilation should be checked at 
intervals while work is in progress. In confined spaces, breathing apparatus may be required. 
 
Welding and cutting equipment must be inspected by a competent person before use. Protective clothing 
and equipment should be worn by the operator and as appropriate by those working with him to protect 
them from particles of hot metal and slag and from accidental burns and to protect their eyes and skin 
from ultra-violet and heat (infra-red) radiation. 
The operator should wear: 
 Eye protection. The type of eye protection depends on the task being carried out.  
 Welding helmet with suitably coloured transparent eyepiece, eye goggles or a hand held shield 
may be suitable alternatives in appropriate circumstances. 
 Long sleeved natural fibre fire retardant coverall. 
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The lack of proper PPE is the major issue on board when it comes to mobilisation when some 
subcontractor turns up without proper PPE. In some cases they will be coming in from various countries 
and may not be able to bring their PPE. Ships usually have limited spare PPE and the thermal coveralls 
needed for the harsh winter. It might be necessary to have the bridge disable the fire alarms in the area. 
If this becomes necessary all affected personnel must be informed. 
 
Before 'hot work' is begun, a check should be made that there are no combustible solids, liquids or gases, 
at, below or adjacent to the work area, which may be ignited by heat or sparks from the work. Particular 
attention should be given to vents from tanks containing combustible fluids. Welding or other hot work 
should never be undertaken on surfaces covered with grease, oil, paint or other flammable or 
combustible substances. 
 
When welding is to be done in the vicinity of open hatches, suitable blankets should be erected to prevent 
sparks dropping down hatchways or ventilators. Port holes or other opening through which sparks may 
fall, should be closed. Fuel tanks or other spaces that have contained flammable substances should be 
tested and certified 'gas free' before any repair work begins. The gas tests are to be carried out by a 
competent person using calibrated meters with proper certificates. When the hot work is completed, the 
area must be thoroughly inspected and monitored continuously for an additional 30 minutes to check 
for delayed fire. This includes the deck below the area and opposite sides of any bulkheads where the 
work took place. 
 
 
F. Confined space entry 
All Entries into Enclosed or Confided Spaces requires a permit to work. All types of tanks, structural 
voids and other types of enclosed spaces should be regarded as potentially dangerous. Lack of adequate 
ventilation means that the atmosphere in the enclosed space may not be sufficient to support life because 
oxygen has been consumed by the rusting of metal, drying of paint etc. Anyone who enters an enclosed 
space where toxic gas is present or there is a low concentration of oxygen will collapse unconscious 
very quickly and without warning. 
 
Some areas seen as part of confined space are  
• Ballast tanks  
• Pits, sumps  
• Boilers  
• Storage tanks  
• Double hulls  
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• Fuel tanks  
• Holds of boats  
• Tank cars  
• Pumping stations  
• Tank trucks  
• Storage bins  
• Other similar spaces  
• Utility vaults 
 
Before entering ventilate the space mechanically with approved apparatus include blowing fans, fume 
extractors etc. The workers need to keep them active all the time when the work is ongoing. There has 
been instance when they have switched off due to the cold air but it’s very important to have the 
ventilation in spite of the cold. 
Before anyone enters any enclosed or confined space, gas tests must be carried out to check for the 
presence of flammable, explosive or toxic gases and also to measure the oxygen content to ensure there 
is an adequate supply of oxygen. The gas tests are to be carried out by a competent person using 
calibrated instruments. No one should enter an enclosed space without wearing breathing equipment 
until the atmosphere has been tested and proved safe. If in doubt about the atmosphere, use breathing 
apparatus. 
 
The oxygen content of the space must be checked at regular intervals and the Officer in charge of the 
operation should decide on the actual frequency when giving out the work permit. Ensure oxygen is not 
used to sweeten an oxygen deficient atmosphere. All valves leading to tanks must be isolated by lockout 
and tag out before anyone enters the compartment. No fuel driven equipment in enclosed spaces as it 
might add toxicity to air. 
  
Any person entering a confined space with limited visibility must use safety harness and lifeline where 
required. The free end of the lifeline should be positioned outside the confined space. This is will aid in 
the evacuation of the person in case if emergency 
 
If during the course of the operation, unforeseen difficulties or hazards develop, the work must be 
stopped if possible and practicable, so that the situation can be fully re-assessed. Take all the equipment 
& tools needed for the job when entering the area and maintain a record of equipment’s taken in.  Prepare 
adequate approved lighting for the space. The return log must be completed the tools are taken out. 
Tools left mistakenly in fuel tanks have led to many machinery troubles in the past.  
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 Anyone entering any potable water tank must wear clean clothing and disinfected footwear, and shall 
not be suffering from skin infections, diarrhoea or any communicable diseases. 
 
Types of gases that could be present in confined spaces (source – worksafebc, 2008) 
 
Table 7 Types of gases that could be present in confined spaces 
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G. Working at height  
The ship owners PTW system has also lots of focus on the working at height. They are well aware of 
dangers associated and have highlighted that in the procedures. They usually include a variety of works 
including working on both maintenance and construction work. Some of the areas identified on the ship 
with frequent working at height are: 
 Mast  
 Deflectors  
 Winches  
 Cranes  
 Davits  
Some of the key features identified in the procedure are  
 Safety harness need to worn at all times while WAH.Safety gear to be inspected prior to use 
every time. The equipment needs to be quarantined properly if found damaged. 
 Use of safety net as seem required at the location of job and Minimum working at height when 
the vessel in sailing as there will be considerable movements. 
 While working near the funnel and mast care should be given to reduce the steam emission as 
much as possible.  
 Before working near the transmission aerial attention to ensure that no transmission to be made 
during course of work.  
 Radio scanner to be locked out prior to working near the radar scanner.  
 Special consideration to be given while transporting the tools to working height. Tool baskets 
to be used.  
 Use of secondary securing of tools in mandatory while working at height. 
 The procedures also mention about maintaining a clear work site at the end of the shift  
It is worthwhile to note that most of near misses are occurring with tool left at height at the end 
of the shift and due to lack of proper clearing out. Some of the companies maintain the log of 
tools that they are taking up scaffolding. When the work team is coming out they need to sign 
out their tools. 
 Scaffolding to be made according regional regulations for the scaffolding. They needs to be 
recertified every 14 days /10 days based on the regulation.  
 Consideration to be given when scaffolding parts are brought onboard and stored with good 
housekeeping regimes. 
 Vessel crew usually uses a simple scaffolding system which does not need extensive training to 
build. 
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4. Case study 3 - Yard  
Another significant stakeholder in the marine subsea industry is the yards where the ships are built on 
worksites when there is substantial maintenance or modification works. According to DNV 
classification of ships the vessels have to be dry docked every 3 years for inspection of the hull. 
Operators usually use this period substantially to perform major maintenance and modification 
operations on the ship. 
There are certain yards that have their own permit system which is to be used instead of the permit that 
is usually run on the vessel. The permit systems on the yards are usually very different form the ships 
as they need to be flexible to meet system requirements for various clients in the ship yard at the same 
time. In Dec 2013 in the old Maersk shipyard in Odense, there were 7 ships in 4 different dry docks and 
quays in the same yard. Each of these ships had different systems which could be very different from 
each other. Another challenge is the fact that these ships are coming in for a few days and there is 
immense focus of time efficiency as these ships will be out of contract during the maintenance period 
with no income to the owners. 
It is also safety critical to have a common system as it will give an overview of the activities that are 
going on in the yard. There needs to be good coordination between the activities going on in the various 
vessels and the common permit system is a good tool. 
In certain yards in Asia the ship is given in full custody of the shipyard and vessel owner can have only 
one representative on the yard at any time as they are sometimes seen as interfering in the progress. 
In this section of the report we will look at a typical example of how a yard sets up a global permit 
system that is valid for all the ships in the yard. 
A. Roles and responsibilities  
All subcontractors for the whole package will be reporting to the main yard as the contractor. The 
subcontractors wold include  
 
Roles  Responsibilities  
Vessel/site 
representative  
Vessel representative will be from the ship owners side (usually the vessel 
manager or superintend) who has good knowledge of the vessel system and 
work that needs to be done. He is in charge of approving the permit requests. 
Also he is also approving the time sheets. 
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Permit officer Permit officer in the contractor side who will look at the JRAs and apply for 
the permit on behalf of the contractor. 
Work team  Personnel who are actually performing the work onsite. They are led by 
Person in charge that is the leader for the work party and is responsible for 
the safety of operations. They participate in tool box talk which will be held 
by the person in charge. 
Person in charge The leader for the work party and is responsible for the safety of operations. 
They participate in tool box talk which will be held by the person in charge. 
HSE site rep He is responsible for  
 Ensure the JRA are suitable and numbered correctly  
 Ensure that the company policies are implemented properly 
 Have site inspections to make sure that the PTW system is 
implemented correctly 
 Point of contact in case of emergency 
Table 8 Roles and responsibilities - cases study 3 
B. Planning and procedures for permit to work 
The planning and the permit to work process in the yard system is different from what is usually followed 
on the ship. The ship yard system is a separate system that could cover for all the ships in the yard at the 
same time. It means that all the personnel can work on various ships under same system and there is no 
confusion and more efficiency in work. This is an online system with unique sectors in the database for 
each vessel. The vessel representative will be able to edit and modify permits in their respective sectors. 
The system of operation in the yard is also very different from other system.  Below is a main features 
and step by step process for the one of yard process 
1. The vessel is usually under the umbrella of the main contractor who will project managing a 
group of subcontractors. The permit system is run by the permit officer in the main contractor.  
2. The subcontractors have daily meeting with the contractors where they will discuss the action 
plan for the next 24 hours. They request for new permits on a daily basis to the permit officer. 
3. Permit officer review the permit request along with the risk assessment presented. Permit officer 
in liaison with the project manager and planner prioritise the work scopes and prepares the 
permit in the online system and forward it to the vessel superintendent /representative. 
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4. Vessel superintendent review all the permits that are have been requested by the contractor and 
he is the final issuing authority for the permit. He can either reject the permit or approve the 
permit with comments.  
5. Once they are approved, the permit is forwarded to the subcontractor PIC and he prints out and 
signs on to the permit form along with the risk assessment and perform the tool box talk along 
with the work party members. These permits will be displayed in the work site.  
6. After the work scope is completed they are PIC will close the permit electronically in the 
database. 
7. The permit officer, vessel superintendent, HSE advisors can monitor the permit status online.  
 
PROCESS FLOW CHART 
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Figure 8 Flowchart showing the PTW process case study 3 
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There are many subcontractors who reports to the main contractor who are usually the yard itself. The 
main subcontractors usually on a ship yard are: 
1. welders , fitters, ship builders ( unique trade in ship yards) 
2. electrical technicians  
3. hydraulic technician  
4. engine technicians 
5. cleaners  
6. painters 
7. NDT techs 
8. Crane drivers and banks men  
9. Forklift operators  
3rd party survey will also liaise with the main subcontractors to identify suitable timing for 
inspection and approval.  
The permits are prepared by the contractor permit officer after subcontractors informs what are the 
permits needed for the following day.  The permit officer will review the JRA of the subcontractors 
and follows up with the permit after he has reviewed the process. 
Permit officer needs to  
1. Have good understanding of the ship and subsystems especially electrical systems which can be 
complicated.  
2. Have good understanding of the scope of work by the subcontractor.  
3. Good communication with the planners and project manager to see the sequence of operations. 
4. Good communications with the vessel superintend.  
There are many pros for having a system run by the main yard contractor. Some of the main pros are: 
1. Contractors apply for permit – they have clear understanding of what is planned for the next 
shift based on the manning plan and progress in the work. 
2. There is need for only limited client reps while following the PTW system.  
3. There is considerable cost savings for the client as there is need for less number of ship 
representatives. 
4. There is good control provided the permit officer have all the information about the vessel. It is 
very relevant if the ship was made in the yard or when she has been there before for other 
modification works. 
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5. They are usually more efficient than using a system based on the ship. This is usually because 
main contractor has better communication their subcontractor. 
But there are some cons as well while following this system 
1. There are limited supervisors / supervision from personnel who are familiar with the vessel. 
2. It could be risky if the contractors do not have all the updated information about the vessel. 
Usually there are some modification made during the vessel time and they may not be updated 
regularly. 
C. Uniqueness of a ship yard  
A yard is very special work location because it is very dynamic work environment with many different 
types of ships coming in for various kinds of inspection and modification activities. Each of these vessels 
could be seen as factory space in on standard and very different from one another. Typical types of 
vessel coming into a yard could be  
1. drilling rigs 
2. heavy lift vessel 
3. major construction vessel 
4. Pipe lay barges 
5. Bulk carriers  
6. oil tankers  
7. seismic vessels 
8. smaller cargo vessels  
9. ferry  
10. cruise ships  
11. fishing trawlers  
By looking at the wide array of types of ships it very clear that there are various types of vessel with 
wide variance of rules and system in place. It’s important that all the workers understand all the 
relevant system well. Also working team needs to be comfortable with the permit system.  
It is also very important to see the infrastructure set up in the yard itself. There are cranes, multi 
wheeler etc. that needs to be planned and have a safe execution with efficient simops. The online 
database system will provide with an overview of all the activities that are ongoing and can help in 
planning a safe operation looking at all the various jobs going on in parallel. The managers and HSE 
officers can have an overview of all the activities happening in the yard and plan accordingly  
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Importance of having coordinated activity in the yard  
Having common system to control the activities is major tool in safe operation of the entire yard 
as all the activities could be planned properly and safely. The picture bellows shows the extend 
modification/repair work that a yard needs to carry out and the complexity of job. 
MSC Flaminia is a post panamax container ship with a capacity of  dead weight tonnage of 85,823 
tons. She is nearly 300 metres (980 ft.) long and 40 metres (130 ft.) wide and was built in 2001 
in Daewoo shipyard in Korea. On 14 July 2012,[4] a fire in hold 4 caused an explosion 
aboard MSC Flaminia while the ship was underway from US, to Antwerp, Belgium, forcing the 
crew to abandon the ship some 1,000 nautical miles (1,900 km; 1,200 mi) from nearest land in 
the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. There was extensive damage to ship and 2 fatalities. 
(Wikipedia). The ship was not granted permission to enter to enter national waters till almost end 
of 2012.  
In end of 2013 she was towed to a yard in Denmark as special environmental systems were needed 
to clean the ship. There was concern of major toxic elements, which had to be handled very 
carefully and area had to be barrier off in the yard. But during the same time there were 7 other 
ships in the same yard. The cleaning activities on the damaged vessel and other operation in the 
nearby vessels had to be coordinated very well with minimal simops.  
 
 
Picture showing the 
vessel in the yard. 
Flaminia in the 
background. 
The yellow painted area 
is the barrier with 
restricted access. 
The block of steel is 
damaged part of ship  
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Picture showing a 
damaged block from the 
vessel 
There are special 
containers to store toxic 
chemicals left inside the 
vessel after the fire 
 
Picture showing the 
aerial view of the MSV 
Flaminia fire damage 
(taken from another 
vessel). 
100 Te crane (servicing 
3 other vessel in the 
same yard ) in the 
background 
 
  
Safety integrity under demanding conditions: A study on Permit-to-Work (PTW) systems in 
the Marine-Subsea sector 
 
pg. 69 
 
 
D. Types of permits and certificates  
The types of permits and certificates in the yard are very similar to the system used by the ship owners. 
I reckon there is already good co-operation and understanding between the two industries of ship owners 
and ship yards as the two industries have been working together very closely. 
Major difference is the fact that there is more focus on permits needed from the land authorities or 
commune as the yard has more interactions with the local municipalities than ship owners. Also there is 
very limited focus on subsea related tasks as the permit system will not be applicable when the vessel is 
out in the sea. 
There is more focus on the roles and responsibilities in the permit in the ship owners system. This is 
because once the ship is in the sea there is limited personnel availability and each and every person 
needs to know what is supposed to be done in case of emergency. In the yard there is more flexibility in 
personnel as more personnel could be mobilised easily. 
The PTW system the yard feels more flexible and less stringent – the reason could be that the work party 
needs to be flexible with lots of different types of system and hence giving room for flexibility. 
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PART THREE: ANALYSIS  
 
5. PTW Gap Analysis 
A. Purpose 
The purpose of this section is to highlight any differences in expectation and guidance between marine 
offshore operator HSEQ procedures and standard ship owner HSEQ standards. In this section YARD 
system are not included as they are similar to ship owner HSEQ standards. 
B. Scope 
To review the contents and guidance provided in both the marine offshore standards and shipping 
procedures and documents. This part mainly focuses on the higher risk procedures which it is felt need 
to be more robust. In summary, suggestions and recommendations for improvement of systems will be 
provided to improve alignment and control between the company procedures. 
 
C. Permit to Work-procedures 
This section compares the main aspects of the permit system including the planning and the various 
procedures associated with the permit to work. For this section the yards have a PTW process which 
could be more comparable to onshore industrial plant. 
 General permit system 
guidelines 
Marine operator  Ship owners 
1 Roles and responsibilities 
have to be clearly defined. 
(As an extension of these 
roles and responsibilities it’s 
important to understand the 
qualification for performing 
each job. Even though it is 
not explicitly mentioned in 
the guidelines – it will be 
very beneficial to list the 
qualification  needed for 
each role) 
Good description with a training 
matrix describing what training is 
needed by each person and on what 
kind of training is needed by each 
personnel. 
There are details in the induction 
process for personnel who will be 
operating within the PTW system. 
This clearly identifies the types of 
work to be completed, the associated 
documents required to support the 
various types of PTW and the process 
to follow to fully apply, monitor and 
close a PTW task. 
 Lack of training matrix for personnel 
involved in the Permit to work process. 
The procedure states "The Master is 
responsible that the Work Permit 
system is understood and followed by 
all crew on board". 
This does not clearly define how the 
personnel will be made to understand 
the system.  
No formal training process in position 
and no records to show that personnel 
have reviewed and fully understood the 
system and their roles within it. 
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 General permit system 
guidelines 
Marine operator  Ship owners 
A check point on the familiarization 
inductions that this presentation has 
been explained and studied (and 
familiarization to be signed) 
- For new crew signing on 
the vessel 
- For shore workers coming 
on board for work that 
require PTW. 
As an example, only the personnel 
with level 3 training in system is able 
to apply for permits and approve 
permits.  
 
 
There is no multi-level system for 
various roles. The general 
presentation is given to everyone 
coming on board. 
2 The validity period of JRA 
is not clearly mentioned  
Procedure makes it clear that a 
specific and thorough Job Risk 
Assessment must be completed with 
every PTW application. 
There is clear description on how 
often they should be reviewed and 
approved (every year even in case of 
routine operations). 
The renewal period and validity of risk 
assessment is not mentioned clearly 
 
3 Require inspection of job 
site – but does not specify 
the frequency of inspection 
There is clear provision for the work 
site inspection. Permit is valid only 
after the responsible engineer inspect 
the site 
The inspection is done by the bridge 
personnel and they are usually limited 
to spot checks only 
 
4 Checklists are not 
mentioned in detail. 
Quick checklist available for many 
permits. There could be more added 
in the future 
There are some check lists available in 
the system. But there could be more 
added to check details and avoid human 
errors. 
5 Highlights the importance 
of tool box talks 
The tool box talks after the permit is 
issued from the bridge. Bridge will go 
through the risk and mark them in the 
permit and talk leader go through 
them. The tool box talk is usually held 
in the work site location. 
The tool box talk needs to be performed 
prior to the permit is issued. All the work 
party members need to sign the tool box 
talk form. The signed tool box talk is 
attached to the permit. Tool box talk 
rarely happens in the work site 
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 General permit system 
guidelines 
Marine operator  Ship owners 
6  Tool box forms and talk are separate The tool box combined together when 
there is a massive mobilisation  
7  New personnel can join the team after 
the permit is granted provided he goes 
through the tool box talk. This gives a 
lot of flexibility of personnel during 
large operations  
All the work party has to be identified 
and should sign the permit before the 
permit is given. Not very flexible when 
there is need for new personnel needs to 
join. This makes it very rigid and 
inflexible and does not lead to best 
utilisation of resources –as personnel 
could not be used for other scopes other 
than where he has attended the tool box 
talk. 
 
  Permit can be valid for more than one 
shift .There is an efficient system in 
place to have permits to be valid for 
more than one shift and the work to be 
able to continue with new set of work 
team. Helps to save much time 
following the permit process  
Permits are usually valid for only one 
shift. The team has to apply for a new 
permit after each shift. this leads to loss 
of time and causes frustration. 
  Individual RP and PIC can fill the 
permit form in the online database. 
Faster process in the IA office 
IA authority fills up he form . Leads to 
long delay in IA office 
Table 9 comparison table -PTW procedures 
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D. Hot work permit  
Vessel sees most hot work permit during yard stays in both mobilizations and maintenance 
/refurbishment periods. The number of hot work permit during operation at sea is very limited. There is 
usually only one rigger/welder per shift on the vessel – seriously limiting hot work capacity.  
The systems controlling the hot work in all the three case studies are very similar. There are some areas 
with varied focuses and are listed below: 
 General permit system 
guidelines 
Marine operators  Ship owners  
1 Working conditions to be 
suitable for job 
Working condition aspects needs to be 
studied in detail and included. 
The Permit focus on the situation of 
working place focusing on sufficient 
lighting. 
2  More details to be given on what kind 
of atmospheric testing is needed.  
 The effectiveness of the ventilation to 
be checked at intervals while work is in 
progress. In confined spaces, breathing 
apparatus may be required. 
3 Barriers to be in place 
wherever necessary 
Decks marked clearly with No weld 
zones.  
The procedure to include clear marking 
of the deck with No weld areas. 
4 Blankets to be placed to 
protect equipment from fire  
Protection of the hatchways to be 
included.  
There is focus on covering hatchways 
with fire protection.  
5 Blankets to be placed to 
protect equipment from 
fire 
Good focus on protecting high 
pressure hoses.  
High pressure hoses protection can be 
added to the checklist.  
Table 10 comparison table -Hot work permit 
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E. Working at Height 
 
When considering the types of tasks that involve working at heights at sea, images of tall masts and deep 
cargo holds often spring to mind. However, numerous tasks at sea involve working at heights. Falls can 
occur anywhere on a ship, such as, ladders, gangways, over the side and stairs in machinery spaces. 
When adding slippery surfaces and ship motion to the equation, the potential for accidents is high. 
(MSA, 2015) 
 
 General permit system 
guidelines 
Marine operators  Ship owners  
1 Roles and responsibilities 
have to be clearly mentioned. 
There is not much description 
on the specification for the 
rescue team. 
Description of responsibilities for each 
person to be involved in the working at 
height is added to ensure all roles are 
clearly defined and can be discussed 
within the work party. Rescue team 
composition could be improved 
Guidelines are provided regarding 
roles and responsibilities within the 
working at height task, issuing 
authority, supervisor, person working 
at height, stand by person etc. But 
more details could be added on the 
responsibilities. Especially the rescue 
team. The ship when working at sea 
will not have access to fire department 
who will be available for land based 
organisation 
2 Height above which there is 
need for permit is varying in 
different parts of the world. 
Example: In UK regulation 
says any work where there is 
potential to injury should be 
covered by the PTW system. 
In middle east its specified as 
2 m. 
Any work or access carried out in an area 
at, above, or below ground level where 
the potential exists to have a fall likely to 
cause personal injury". 
This removes the limit for work at height 
and should ensure that consideration is 
given to any operations which could 
potentially expose the operator to 
potential falls leading to injury. 
Ship owner policy states a permit to 
work is required for all tasks that 
require working at heights above 2 
meters.  
 
3 HSE UK specifies the need to 
challenge the need to work at 
height 
There is a section in the permit system 
that will challenge the need for WAH (to 
find alternatives).WAH should be 
avoided if possible  
A section could be added to look into 
possibilities to reduce work at height 
and reduction of potential hazards.  
 
4 Not sufficient focus on the 
checklist  
There is working at height planning 
checklist to be used to ensure no human 
errors or all practical evaluation are made 
for the safe operations working at height  
The checklist has been recently 
introduced on the ship system. Wide 
range implementation is still ongoing  
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 General permit system 
guidelines 
Marine operators  Ship owners  
5 Training needs to be 
provided and documented 
Training requirements for personnel 
working at height and being a member 
of the rescue team needs to be described 
better – especially considering the wide 
range of equipment and system and 
training available in the market today. 
Roles are better descried in this system. 
Training requirements for personnel 
working at height and being a member 
of the rescue team needs to be 
described better – especially 
considering the wide range of 
equipment and system and training 
available in the market today 
6 *specific to marine industry Special care to be added while working 
near the steam outlets like funnel or near 
mast  
Special care already included working 
near the funnel and mast care should 
be given to reduce the steam emission 
as much as possible 
7  Need to update the procedure while 
working near aerials 
Special care already in place Before 
working near the transmission aerials 
to ensure that no transmission to be 
made during course of work  
8 *specific to marine industry Lockout of the radar scanner to be added 
in  procedure  
Radio scanner to be locked out prior 
to working near the radar scanner  
Table 11comparison table -WAH 
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F. Confined Space Entry 
A confined space is an enclosed or partially enclosed area that is big enough for a worker to enter. It is 
not designed for someone to work in regularly, but workers may need to enter the confined space for 
tasks such as inspection, cleaning, maintenance, and repair. A small opening or a layout with 
obstructions can make entry and exit difficult and can complicate rescue procedures. (worksafebc.com) 
 General permit system 
guidelines 
Marine operators  Ship owners  
1 Need for details in the 
roles and responsibilities  
Details on roles and responsibility 
defined clearly. Needs to identify 
clearly the rescue team with names 
on each shift.   
Include section of responsibilities for 
each person to be involved in the 
Confined Space Entry process to ensure 
all roles are clearly defined and can be 
discussed within the work party.  
 
2 Need for monitoring the 
quality of gas 
Requires continuous gas 
monitoring  
( it may not be practical to get a 
third party gas analyser for 
continuous monitoring as specified-  
especially when offshore  
Mentions about testing the gas before 
starting the work. Monitoring to be made 
every 12 hours or under captain’s 
discretion  
 
3 Training specified  Requirement for training clearly 
specified  
Training in confined space is applicable 
for all ABs seaman on board. 
 
4 Rescue equipment should 
be in site  
Rescue equipment to be placed 
near the confined space. This needs 
to be taken into account while 
ordering the spare kits , especially 
when it’s in yard with many tank 
entries  
More practical approach to placement of 
emergency equipment. There are 
dedicated places in the ship with quick 
reach of all personnel /confined space 
entry guard 
5 Checklist and rescue plan Confined Space Entry procedure is 
supported by any additional 
planning documents or rescue 
plans. 
 
 
There can be following attachments to the 
permit:  
Method Statement.  
Job Risk Assessment 
Rescue plan and checklist.  
Isolation Confirmation Certificate (ICC).  
Gas Test Certificate.  
Confined Space Entry Certificate.  
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 General permit system 
guidelines 
Marine operators  Ship owners  
6  Update needed on the system to 
address the valves to the work site 
States clearly that the valves leading to 
the confined space needs to be locked and 
tagged 
7 Gas to be tested regularly Gas to be tested every 2 hours by 
third party  
 
The officer in charge to decide the 
frequency of gas testing needed in the 
confined space  
Table 12comparison table CSE 
G. Electrical/mechanical Isolation  
On review of the information contained and the application of the electrical system procedure and 
isolations it is found that the processes followed by the stakeholders are very similar. 
The system is sufficient to control the normal levels of operations with the above listed procedures 
giving personnel suitable guidance on the expectations for work with electrical systems. 
There have been concerns in the past regarding the suitability of the system, but any faults identified 
and incidents involving electrical systems may have come through a lack of training and understanding 
of the procedural requirements due to the lack of formal training in the PTW systems. Human factor 
usually plays a massive role in this case. 
 
H. Importance of competency matrix 
The marine operator system has more focus on training and competency tracking. The integrated system 
includes the tracking of the competency matrix. The PTW guidelines are very clear on the importance 
of having clear roles and responsibility. Taking this further competency matrix plays a critical part in 
identifying who can take up the roles.  
Personnel available on the ship should have their skills and training to be updated and the authorities 
should be able to track the skill set available. 
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PART FOUR: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
IMPROVEMENT 
 
6. Suggestions  
Studying the different types permit systems prevalent in the subsea marine industry –it seems that there 
is need for a more concentrated and joined effort from the various stakeholders and to develop a system 
that could be used as a general template. There are lots of features that could be adapted from one another 
and other similar industries such as the onshore oil and gas industry.   
It seems to be high time when all the parties come together and address the PTW system and this will 
be one of the key for a successful integrated operation. Below are list of suggestions for each section. 
A. Roles and responsibilities  
As the regulation mentions, earlier roles and responsibilities have to be clearly defined with as much 
details as possible. 
It is noted that there are different titles that are being used in the industry loosely depending on the back 
ground of the user.  They could eventually lead to confusions and if there are different titles they should 
be grouped together or addressed together in the permit descriptions. 
An exclusive list of all the various titles that is used in the industry and what the specific job descriptions 
for these titles are has been compiled and is given below. 
Roles  Responsibilities  
Captain/ vessel 
master 
The captain of the ship has the final authority on the vessel.  He has the 
overall responsibility for the safety of personnel and operations onboard. He 
also ensures the competences of people for doing the job.  
Construction 
Manager 
The Construction Manager is responsible for the management of the permit 
to work system for the construction scope of work. On a third party vessel 
OCM will be the responsible for ensuring the company policy are followed. 
There is usually a bridging document showing the responsibility sharing 
between OCM and captain. 
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Issuing authority/ 
bridge 
Issuing authority is usually the chief officer who is responsible for reviewing 
and approving of JRA, ensuring the validity and correctness of the work 
permit, along with suspension of relevant work permits when applicable. 
They are verifying the isolation certificates for the job.  
HSE coordinator Vessel HSE coordinator is an offshore position with lots different scopes to 
perform. 
 Ensure the JRA are suitable and numbered correctly  
 Ensure that the company policies are implemented properly 
 Assist the OCM in the implementation company philosophy 
 Have site inspection to ensure that the PTW system ae implemented 
correctly  
Responsible 
engineer/ 
Responsible 
personnel 
The Vessel master/offshore construction manager appoints a Responsible 
Person/responsible personnel for a specific location/job. He is responsible to 
ensure that the work in the allocated location is carried out under the correct 
regimes. Vessel master maintains a list of competent persons who can act as 
area responsible. 
Chief 
engineer/System 
Supervisor  
Technical expert –refers to a person identified as the technical expert on the 
area on the machinery that is going to be worked upon. Before a planned 
maintenance is to be carried out , the responsible person discusses with Chief 
engineer/ System supervisor to let him know about the details for the work 
that is needed to be performed and associated risk or supervisory 
considerations required. Usually there is chief engineer on the vessel who is 
the expert on the vessel system and there are system supervisors for each 
main system in the vessel. 
Work team  Personnel who are actually performing the work onsite. They are led by 
Person in charge who is the leader for the work party and is responsible for 
the safety of operations. They participate in tool box talk which will be held 
by the person in charge. 
Person in charge The person actually carrying out the work, or leading the work party. PIC’s 
are responsible for: 
 should have completed understanding of the scope 
 safe execution of assigned work scope 
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 Lead the tool box talk with the work party  
 Coordinate with IA and RP 
 Ensuring a clean and safe work site 
 close out of the permit with the bridge at the end of the shift 
 Ensure a good handover with the back to back team  
Isolation authorities Isolation authorities, appointed by the vessel master, competent to approve 
electrical, mechanical or instrument isolations. Also they ensure that the 
proposed isolations do not have any impact anywhere else. For the electrical 
items on the vessel it will be the vessel electrician. 
Gas tester Suitably trained and competent individuals who are authorized by the Vessel 
Master to test for the presence of flammable vapours, toxic gases and oxygen 
within confined spaces.  
Permit officer Permit officer is dedicated to look at the scopes of works, JRAs and apply for 
the permit. He is also responsible for following up the permit system. 
Table 13 Roles and responsibilities - suggestion 
 
B. Planning and categorization of risk 
Planning for the implementation of the PTW system and the execution for the job can make the real 
difference in safe execution. As Tom Landry says ‘Setting a goal is not the main thing, It is deciding 
how one will go about achieving it.’  
The same is relevant in this case where we need to identify how best we can plan and implement the 
PTW system correctly. 
i. Pre audit  
The subsea marine industry being so dynamic with so many stakeholders-what previous project example 
have clearly pointed out is the gap in the expectations of various stake holders when they come together. 
Of course it might not be possible to have a pre audit every time but they should be employed every 
time there is possibility. 
For the proper implementation of the permit system and to understand and appreciate all the aspects of 
the permit system for the marine subsea industry would be to have a through audit of the potential 
quayside or dockside. Personal suggestion would be to have frame agreements with the quay side so 
that the pre audits, explanation for the scope of work and other audits could be completed up front.  
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1. The subcontractors coming on from the quay side should have a good understanding of the 
permit system. In 2013 when Technip took one of her major chartered vessel to Denmark in a 
new dry dock, there were many audits and presentations where the expectation on HSE, scope 
of work and PTW systems were given. It was seen as a major factor in the successful 
completion of the job because as soon the expensive vessel came in there was no confusion on 
the permit system and the workers were able to go to work directly. 
2. Another major issue that creeps up most of the time is lack of proper PPE. Offshore industry 
has some of the highest requirements compared to other industry which are relevant and related 
like the ship building industry. In 2015 there was an incident in one of the North Sea vessel 
where the subcontractor welder PPE caught fire onboard because the PPE was not completely 
fire proof. Pre audit checking the PPE is one of the most important item to be audited. Audit 
of a random worksite in the yard is important and expectations have to be conveyed clearly.  
There has also been a very positive improvement in the past. Steel done company in Finland 
has a major success story on this where they performed excellently well with training on the 
HSE system. This was all the more commendable considering that they had very limited 
experience in the North Sea oil and gas industry. 
3. The subcontractor supervisors should be sent detailed scope of work prior to the ship coming 
to the quay side so that they can be familiar with the vessel.   
4. The subcontractor supervisors should be sent the vessel drawings   prior to the ship coming to 
the quay side so that they can be familiar with the vessel if there is substantial work below 
deck. 
6.1.1. Pre mobilization meeting   
While Pre mobilization meetings can ensure that the systems are in place and as expected –it is important 
to have a pre mobilization meeting with the yard. It’s advisable for an engineer from the ship to be 
available on the quay side prior to the vessel arrival. 
1. He should be able to give scope briefing to subcontractor personnel 
2. He can update the subcontractor management with vessel ETA and ensure all personnel are 
ready when the vessel is arriving  
3. He can be the interface with the vessel. Arranging and helping out in case there is any issues 
with  
a. Pilot for the area 
b. Ensure there are bollards available for mooring  
 Ensure there is personnel for mooring the vessel 
 Procure any last minute items 
Safety integrity under demanding conditions: A study on Permit-to-Work (PTW) systems in 
the Marine-Subsea sector 
 
pg. 82 
 
4. More focus should be given in the vessel inductions on the permit system of the vessel and the 
modes of display.   
5. Vessel should prioritize going into ‘mother ports’ where the workers are familiar with the 
systems from the past projects.  
Project teams should have prior meeting and presentation on the work and risk assessments should be 
done prior to ship arriving at the berth. 
 
C. Procedure relevant to PTW 
 
i. Checklist for each permits  
Checklist is one of the features that was present in the marine contractors system.  They were found to 
be suitable and accepted by all the other stakeholders and all agreed that it would help tremendously for 
reducing the human factor errors in the permit to work system.   
The checklist will differ from vessel to vessel based on operational features of the vessel. There are 
certain features that would remain common for all.  These systems have been used extensively in the 
Middle East onshore sector and have been very successful. 
It is worthwhile to note that during the course of this thesis some of the ship owner systems were actually 
incorporating new checklist into their existing systems. 
ii. Request for permits 
Permits have to be filled in by PIC (marine operator system) or IA ship owner system. Both have 
advantages. Personal suggestion is that PIC and IA need to work on the same online platform in case of 
any major modification work in the ship. There should be good training for the PIC and RP about the 
vessel layout and on how to fill in the forms so that there are correct requests with similar standards.  
If the issuing authorities are doing all the permits it takes a lot of time for permits to come by in case of 
a large modification work. Here it will be beneficial to have permit officer like what is available in the 
onshore system.  A dedicated permit officer position has proven the worth in on shore industry and in 
certain ship yards. 
iii. Warning system –mapping the dependencies 
Update the permit system with dependencies – If a work permit is taken out on one system the software 
should be able to tell all the affected system so as to give precaution/ warning to the issuing authority 
for a closer look. This will help immensely to reduce the human factors of judgmental errors or 
knowledge about the particular system. This could be done in detail in an office environment and should 
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be done during the design phase of any system. These dependencies should be identified during the 
design phase and should be marked in the FMECA. 
iv. Including check boxes for certificates  
 Permit system should have name samples for the type of certificates to be included (ex: diving, isolation 
etc.). This will help in reducing the human error of not picking up a relevant certificate. In certain permit 
system, it mentions all the possible certificates and the PIC when requesting the permit ticks of the 
relevant boxes. 
In the permit system more focus should be on marine side of operations and other stake holder should 
include the feature present in the ship owners system. An example of this would be the need for port 
notification. In Norway there is need for special permits if we need to do any deployment testing in the 
fjords, the navy has to be notified and there is need for special permit from the authorities. 
v. Validity period for JRAs 
JRAs are the starting points for a safe operation and issuing authorities have to look into the JRAs prior 
to issuing the permit. It is also important to have an updated JRA. It’s required to update the JRS every 
year in the marine operator system. This should be a norm across all the PTW regimes by all the 
stakeholders to update the JRAs every year. This will ensure updating the risk assessment to meet the 
latest technological advancements and new methodology of operations. 
vi. Display of permit  
The display of the permits both in the IA room and work site is very vital for avoiding errors and is part 
of the emergency response philosophy. 
In 2015 NSG added an A0 plotted vessel drawing in the bridge (issuing authority office) so that the IA 
can look at vessel drawing for quick references. Also unique color magnetic stickers were placed at the 
location of work on the drawing. They also have a permit showcase where they have sorted the various 
permits for easy tracking. In case of an emergency in a particular location the IA can identify all the 
work going on in the location very quickly without going through the entire paperwork. This is a very 
common practice in the vessel. 
It is also important to have a showcase carrying the copies of all the permits which are active. They 
needs to be sorted according to the kind of permit it is. This will help in identifying the details for any 
particular permit. The subsea marine industry definitely needs an improvement in the way the permits 
are displayed in the worksites. The vessel needs to have better systems to display the permit. Most of 
the time the signed permit just ends up with the PIC as the mechanism of display is not well defined. 
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vii. Slips trips and falls and working at height  
Slips trips and falls contribute to a major proportion of the accident happening at the work place. This 
is a major concern in the marine subsea industry as well. There are welding hoses and electrical cable 
that come one the deck during the mobilisation and leads to accidents. The cold winters in North Sea 
sector results in very icy decks and most of the ships take lots of care to maintain an anti-slippery deck. 
They include actions like clearing the water, adding salt, using anti slip paints etc. 
When it comes to good housekeeping and hose management its essential to drive in the point with the 
work team to maintain the work place safe. The bigger percentages of accidents happen in the beginning 
of the shift when the work party is not sure of the trip hazards. In 2014 Technip made a major drive to 
reduce slip and trips and all work party members were asked to clean the work site and maintain good 
housekeeping in the last 15 minutes of their shift. There was major improvement when it comes to safety 
and general tidiness.  
When working on scaffolding it will be good to maintain a tool log showing which tools are taken to the 
top of the scaffolding. They can be logged out when they are brought down. This is a proven method 
for preventing loose objects when working at height 
There could be a section in the permit form for the inspection party to check the tidiness of the work 
place before the permit is approved.  
Need for focus on slips and falls – PTW system could be used as a tool to ensure that there is good 
housekeeping and hence less chances for injury.   ‘No permit to an untidy workplace’ 
 
According data collected by Health and Safety executive, UK, 2014.  
 In 2013/2014 STFs were responsible for more than half (57%) of all major/specified and 
almost three in ten (29%) over seven-day injuries to employees, making up 36% of all 
reported injuries to employees (RIDDOR).  
 986 thousand working days due to slips & trips 
Safety integrity under demanding conditions: A study on Permit-to-Work (PTW) systems in 
the Marine-Subsea sector 
 
pg. 85 
 
 
Table 14Reported injuries to employees, 2013/14p (RIDDOR all enforcing authorities) 
 
 
Table 15Major/specified slip, trip and fall injuries to employees (RIDDOR, 2007/08 to 2013/14p) 
 
Table 16Major/specified slip, trip and fall injuries to employees by season, 2013/14p (RIDDOR) 
It is heartening to know that there is not substantial increase in the number during winter. 
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viii. Confined space entry  
The regulation advices for regular testing of gases in confined spaces. But they are not concrete on the 
time interval between different testing by 3rd party verification. This is a major point of contention as 
some of the permit system says the gases needs to be tested every 2 hours and some states the officer 
has the authority to decide based on the circumstances. 
I reckon that it is in best interest to give the authority for the officer in charge to decide with one 
mandatory test every day. Previous project have shown that this is a practical and safe approach. This is 
important from a practical point of you as to have a gas testing done at every location every 2 hours on 
a massive ship will not be possible. This will not be possible in a yard scenario with major modification 
work. The small personnel gas monitors should be worn at all times. 
ix. Duration of permit validation 
The duration of permit should be open for subjective judgment of the issuing authority or the vessel 
master. Some permits should be given for very short duration of time depending on the type of work. 
For example, if there is work on any of the safety critical items like the interventions on the fire and 
safety alarms or fire water systems or DP systems. It has to be kept to minimum time and the RP should 
be responsible for informing the IA about the completion pf the job and isolations have to be restored 
to normal safe positions in case of the large rebuild or modification for the vessel – the time frame 
flexibility should be a big time and resource saver.  I suggest that in case of the large scopes where 
duration could be for many months the permits should be valid for 2 weeks and needs to be renewed 
every 2 weeks.  
 
Pros:  
a. Will increase efficiency and will promote continuity of work if the permits are taken 
available for 2 weeks. Personnel will be able to continue the work. 
b. Will reduce paper work 
c. RP can concentrate on the actual job rather than in meetings 
 
Cons  
a. The work party, PIC and RP needs to keep a close vigil and ensure that the nature of work 
has not changed after the permit has been issued. 
b. RP and IA have to be careful about the simops in the area and extra care needs to be taken 
to ensure that work party is aware of the ongoing activities.  
I suggest that a tool box talk prior to each shift where these are covered should be made 
compulsory. This could be combined in to work party shift handover talk. So that all people 
associated with the job can meet and discuss the progress of work and challenges to the 
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work. Also it can be the forum to discuss about the safety concerns, simops from other group 
of workers that are doing different scope pf work  
x. Tool box talk 
Tools for tool box talks  
Recommendations: 
1. All tool box form should have a small description or signs showing the potential hazards which 
could serve as a reminder for the PIC. 
2. The relevant hazard boxes could be ticked off as they are discussed. 
3. Tool box talks could be aided by flyers and notice cards which could compile the lessons learnt 
from past incidents for similar scope of work. 
4. There can be sign boards detailing the job and hazards. 
5. A tool box to be done at the beginning of each shift.  It could be combined with a shift handover 
which could make it efficient by saving time. 
xi. Follow up of permits 
Proper follow up of the permit system and the individual permits are vital for the safe execution of job.  
The regulations in general have not been clear on the level of supervision or follow up needed. Of course 
it will depend on the type of operation that is going on in the site. 
There should be better guidelines on  
1. Frequency of site inspection  
2. Roles and responsibility on who is going to follow up / inspect the site 
3. What kind of testing is needed as a part of inspection ( example: frequency of gas testing) 
The inspection plan should be aided by an inspection checklist. Inspection checklist are important for 
the correct inspection plan. This is very common in the PTW system in Middle East onshore sector. 
Attached is a checklist for scaffolding inspection.  
The present permit system does not specify how many permit one person can be in charge of at any 
particular time. It will be unreasonable to expect one person to follow up many permits. In Australia it 
is mandatory that the maximum number of permits that a person can be in charge of at any given time 
is 4.  
For following up, the Ship owner system have work location responsible. It’s a very positive step for 
the follow up and should be incorporated in other system as well. 
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Example for the inspection checklist used by a Middle East EPCI contractor 
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D. Certificate attachments to permit system 
Certificates and attachments form the vital cog in the permit to work system in order to ensure that that 
the entire barriers are in place. JRA will identify the risk that are involved with the operation and the 
also the barriers that are in place to ensure safety of both personnel and equipment. The certificates give 
accountability to the barrier that is in place. The work party should be able to check the certificates and 
should be able to work with assurance. 
i. Isolation certificates  
Isolation certificates for both hydraulic, mechanical and electrical has to be in place prior to intervention. 
It will be very beneficial to have various attachments to these certificates which could add more 
information to the certificates. 
Attachment for the isolation certificates 
As attachment there could be: 
1. Isolation tags – showing details for the isolation. Some of the systems have tag numbers with a 
copy of the tag stored with the IA. This will make it easily traceable. Also in case of an 
emergency it will be quicker to trace the isolation responsible and get the system back up and 
running if needed. 
2. Caution notices- There can be caution notices attached which give more information to the 
workers in the area. 
3. Electrical disconnection labels- Electrical disconnection labels show the status of the connection 
with the leads. 
4. Marked up engineering and electrical drawings- Marked up engineering drawings are to be 
attached to the certificates. They shows the modification that going on in the work site,  
5. P &ID drawings. 
6. Isolation procedure based on the system. 
 
ii. Electrical isolations   
Electrical isolation has to in place with padlocks in the switchboard before intervention to the electrical 
systems onboard. Most of the PTW system uses two padlocks –key to one to be kept with the isolating 
authority and key to the other one with the PIC so as to ensure that there is no accidental energizing of 
the circuit.  
I suggest numbering the padlocks and keeping a register in the issuing authority’s office to identify who 
is in charge of the isolation padlocks. I have also seen that as soon as isolation authority puts on a lock 
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he will add his name and phone number as separate tag so that he could be called in in case of questions 
or emergencies. 
 SIDE: Switch off, Isolate, Dump and Earth should be the guide words for the electrical isolations and 
should be mentioned in the tool box talks. 
iii. Confined space 
Confined space entry permit seems to be the most sought after and grey area in the marine subsea 
industry. There has been a lot of confusion ongoing being what is defined as an enclosed space and what 
is a confined space – with the rules and regulations being so much different for either. The suggestion 
is to add a confined space determination form. 
An example for a confined space determination form is attached below –such forms are used in the 
onshore industry business. 
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The vessel has limited rescue team member on each shift. The IA needs to ensure that there are sufficient 
personnel for rescue from both confined space and working overboard. If there are not sufficient 
personnel on-board then the permit should not be given at the same time. No confined space entry and 
working overboard at the same time should be allowed as there is no enough rescue party. A check box 
could be added for reminding the IA about his worst case manning scenarios. 
Safety integrity under demanding conditions: A study on Permit-to-Work (PTW) systems in 
the Marine-Subsea sector 
 
pg. 92 
 
Anyone entering any confined potable water tank must wear clean clothing and disinfected footwear, 
and shall not be suffering from skin infections, diarrhoea or any communicable diseases. 
 
iv. Working at height  
 
Working at height along with slips and trips leads to the most injuries. It should receive more attention 
considering the extensive motion of the vessel. More focus needs to be given to drive in the safety 
culture into this particular area – to reduce individual human factors  
  
Figure 9 Fig: Number of safety factors identified in falls from height incidents 
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v. Matrix showing the certificates needed  
 
In some of the Australian onshore industries they have certificate matrix showing what certificates are 
needed for each permit.  It could be a good idea to introduce them in the marine subsea industry as well 
as to give the PIC and IA a quick overview of the paper work that is required to complete the planned 
task. 
Certificate types Hot work permit CSE Electrical 
Radiation certificate  *  
Excavation certificate  * * 
WAH certificate * * * 
Isolation certificate * * * 
Heavy lift certificate     
Road impact notice * * * 
JRA * * * 
Table 17An example for certification matrix ( example from onshore work Australia) 
 
E. Recommendations to the stakeholder management 
The permit system similar to the HSE systems demands high level transparency. It also calls for a very 
open arm approach towards each other.  The operators for oil and gas topside have very strict and 
controlled regime where as some of the older yards have not got up to speed on the HSE standards and 
requirements. A symbiotic attitude could lead to development of all parties involved with a better 
understanding of each other. 
It is time for the all the major players to sit together and set up a standard that could serve as a good 
template for the marine subsea industry. The oil and gas industry have to take the initiative to iron out 
the variations and put forward the expectation.  There has been some discussion on the cost associated 
with such an enterprise. This will definitely help to bring down the quality cost and will increase 
efficiency of operation, leading to savings of millions NOK annually.  This is a humble call for the 
industry to rise and prepare for the interesting challenges that is ahead of us. 
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